

JPRS-TND-93-029
17 September 1993



JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-029

CONTENTS

17 September 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

ERRATUM: In the previous Proliferation Issues book, dated 3 September 1993, the book number should read JPRS-TND-93-028.

AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA

Signing of Chemical Weapons Convention Discussed [SAPA, 31 Aug 93]	1
--	---

CHINA

U.S. 'Stirring Up Trouble' in Relations With PRC [Xu Ximin; WEN WEI PO, 31 Aug 93]	2
Aircraft Purchase Issue, Ukraine-Taiwan Ties Viewed [XINHUA, 8 Sep 93]	2
Reportage on 'Yinhe' Cargo Ship	3
'Yinhe' Leaves Saudi Arabia for UAE [XINHUA, 7 Sep 93]	3
'Yinhe' Unloads Cargo in UAE, Departs for Home [Chen Wenru, Jiao Yensheng; XINHUA, 8 Sep 93]	3
Report Provides Details on 'Yinhe' Incident [Liu Yegang; XINHUA, 5 Sep 93]	3
Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on 'Yinhe' Incident [XINHUA, 4 Sep 93]	6
Text of NPC Statement on 'Yinhe' Incident [XINHUA, 6 Sep 93]	8
'Yinhe' Incident Allegedly Cost Company \$12.93 Million [XINHUA, 4 Sep 93]	8
Pakistani Support Over 'Yinhe' Incident Reported [XINHUA, 7 Sep 93]	9
Hong Kong, Macao Dailies Cited on 'Yinhe' Incident [XINHUA, 6 Sep 93]	9

EAST ASIA

AUSTRALIA

Canberra Willing To Help Jakarta Develop Nuclear Program [Melbourne Radio, 1 Sep 93]	11
--	----

JAPAN

Aerospace Firms With U.S. Technology Seek Ties [Peta Firth; THE STANDARD, 1 Sep 93]	11
Plans To Work on Indefinite Extension of NPT [KYODO, 5 Sep 93]	11

NORTH KOREA

IAEA's Meyer Says That Duration of DPRK Talks Depend on Contents [YONHAP, 31 Aug 93]	12
Japanese Government To Pursue Talks With Government [YONHAP, 30 Aug 93]	12
YONHAP Reports No Date Set for Third Round U.S.-DPRK Talks [YONHAP, 4 Sep 93]	12
IAEA Inspections 'Unfair,' Impartiality Questioned [Pyongyang Radio, 31 Aug 93]	13
Atomic Energy Ministry Comments on 1-3 Sep Talks With IAEA [KCNA, 8 Sep 93]	14
Delegate's Speech on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 3 Sep 93]	14
Spokesman's Statement on North-South Talks [Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 31 Aug 93]	15
Talks With U.S. Said To Be Going Well, ROK Criticized [Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 5 Sep 93]	17
Proposals on Total Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Endorsed [KCNA, 3 Sep 93]	17
KCNA Denies Reports of Uranium Ore Smuggling [KCNA, 6 Sep 93]	18

SOUTH KOREA

Vice Minister-Level Talks With DPRK on 7 Sep Proposed [YONHAP, 2 Sep 93]	18
Journal Describes KSR-420 'Scientific' Rocket [KUKBANG KWA KISUL, Aug 93]	18
U.S. To Talk With DPRK If Inter-Korean Talks Agreed [YONHAP, 30 Aug 93]	20
IAEA Delegation Arrives in Pyongyang 31 Aug [Cha Man-sun; KES-1 Radio Network, 31 Aug 93]	21

THAILAND

Pressure To Recall Workers in Libyan Chemical Plants [THE NATION, 2 Sep 93]	21
---	----

EAST EUROPE

CZECH REPUBLIC

Commission on Banning Chemical Weapons Formed [CTK, 6 Sep 93]	22
---	----

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Lawmaker Denies Weapons Technology Transfer to Iraq [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS, 2 Sep 93]	23
Government Planning Construction of Small Nuclear Plants [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS, 29 Aug 93]	23

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Foreign Secretary on Rao's PRC Visit, Missile Issue [All India Radio Network, 4 Sep 93]	24
U.S. To Pressure India To Subscribe to MTCR Guidelines [M. K. Dhar; THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 28 Aug 93]	24
ISRO Head Says Country Had Cryogenic Rocket Expertise [All India Radio Network, 2 Sep 93]	25

IRAN

Iranian Nuclear Energy Chief on Iran's Program, Israel [TEHRAN TIMES, 18 Aug 93]	25
Japanese Envoy on Iran's Use of Nuclear Technology [IRIB Television First Program Network, 30 Aug 93]	26

PAKISTAN

Foreign Secretary Says U.S. Talks Constructive, Positive [Radio Pakistan Overseas Service, 4 Sep 93]	26
Nuclear Program Said To Be Frozen at 1990 Level [Radio Pakistan Overseas Service, 2 Sep 93]	26
U.S. Termed 'World Bully' for Sanctions Policy [THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER, 27 Aug 93]	26
U.S. Seen 'Losing Battle' on Proliferation Policy [THE MUSLIM, 27 Aug 93]	27
Nuclear Program Will Not Be Abandoned Despite U.S. Policy [THE MUSLIM, 30 Aug 93]	27
Editorial Urges U.S. Pressure Against India [THE NATION, 30 Aug 93]	28
Foreign Minister on U.S. Sanctions, Indian Relations [Radio Pakistan Network, 1 Sep 93]	29
Television Reports Opening of Talks With U.S. [PTV Television Network, 3 Sep 93]	29

CENTRAL EURASIA

RUSSIA

'Text' of Russian-Ukrainian Communique Released [ITAR-TASS, 4 Sep 93]	30
Glavkosmos Said To Pursue India Cryogenic Engines Deal [Sergey Leskov; IZVESTIYA, 17 Aug 93]	30

Atomic Minister on Nuclear Issues, Ukraine [Viktor Mikhaylov Interview; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 18 Aug 93]	31
U.S. To Grant Russia \$85 Million for Nuclear Disarmament [Arkadiy Sidoruk; ITAR-TASS, 3 Sep 93]	33
Yeltsin Rules Out Nuclear Status for Ukraine [Leonid Timofeyev; ITAR-TASS, 3 Sep 93]	33
Yeltsin Interviewed on Talks With Kravchuk [Boris Yeltsin Interview; Russian Television Network, 4 Sep 93]	33
'Priority Tasks' in Handling Radioactive Waste Approved [ITAR-TASS, 29 Aug 93]	34
Government Sets Priorities for Handling Nuclear Waste [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, 2 Sep 93]	34
Military Space Forces Launch Cosmos 2262 [Seman Ivanov; ITAR-TASS World Service, 7 Sep 93]	34
Export Control of Dual Purpose Goods To Be Tightened [Vadim Bardin; KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 10 Sep 93]	34
ARMENIA	
Grachev on Nuclear Weapons on Ukrainian Territory	35
Recycling Weapons Stressed [Andrey Naryshkin; ITAR-TASS, 4 Sep 93]	35
More on Grachev's Remarks [Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 5 Sep 93]	36
BELARUS	
Shushkevich on Speeding Up Nuke Withdrawal [Vladimir Glod; ITAR-TASS, 1 Sep 93]	36
U.S. Equipment To Help Control Nuclear Components [Radio Minsk Network, 30 Aug 93]	36
ESTONIA	
Preliminary Work for Removal of Soviet Reactor Complete [ETA NEWS RELEASE, 2 Sep 93]	37
KAZAKHSTAN	
Nazarbayev Calls for Testing Moratorium Until 2005 [Fedor Ignatov; ITAR-TASS, 30 Aug 93]	37
TAJIKISTAN	
Islamic Power Could Mean Nuclear Proliferation [Leonid Veksler; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Aug 93]	37
UKRAINE	
Talks Held With U.S. Officials on Nuclear Arms Aid [UNIAN, 1 Sep 93]	39
Nuclear Workers Against Closure of Chernobyl AES [Radio Ukraine World Service, 1 Sep 93]	39
Former Vice Premier Urges Nonnuclear Status [Yefim Shvartsman; ITAR-TASS, 31 Aug 93]	39
Foreign Ministry Official Urges European Security System [Boris Tarasiuk; WPROST, 22 Aug 93]	39
Defense Ministry Studies Feasibility of Space-Missile Force [UNIAN, 3 Sep 93]	40
Further on Agreements With Russia on Nuclear Weapons [ITAR-TASS, 4 Sep 93]	40
Government To Disarm, Transfer Nuclear Weapons to Russia [Paris AFP, 3 Sep 93]	40
Incident at Weapons Store, Russian Nuclear Experts Called [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Sep 93]	41
WEST EUROPE	
GERMANY	
Machine Components for Iran Seized at Italian Border [BILD, 28 Aug 93]	42
TURKEY	
Officer Views Antimissile Defense Capability, 'Threat' [Murat Yetkin; TURKISH DAILY NEWS, 27 Aug 93]	42
Objections to \$2-Billion Iranian Rearming Campaign [Sedat Sertoglu; SABAH, 3 Sep 93]	43

SOUTH AFRICA

Signing of Chemical Weapons Convention Discussed

*MB3108093193 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0811 GMT 31 Aug 93*

[Text] Pretoria Aug 31 SAPA—Implications for local industries of the envisaged world-wide ban on chemical weapons could not be compared to the effects of sanctions which would have been imposed had South Africa not agreed to the ban when signing the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC].

This was the word from the Department of Trade and Industry on Tuesday in reaction to concerns among some South African chemical companies that the country's signing of the convention on January 14, 1993, might lead to "unnecessary intervention by the state."

Sanctions by the 142 member countries of the CWC could have been expected had South Africa not signed the convention.

"Punitive measures against offenders and non-signatories apply to raw materials, end products and the capital needs of the industry," the department said in a statement.

Non-proliferation of chemical weapons meant control over the import and export of equipment and technology which might contribute to the development, stockpiling and deployment of chemical weapons, it added.

The CWC is expected to be implemented in 1995.

To ensure compliance with the CWC, all member countries would be required to report on those chemical industries involved in the processes or in the manufacture of chemicals that could be used to produce weapons.

The department said provision was also being made to verify information through inspections by an international body established to implement and monitor the CWC.

South Africa had valuable technology, capabilities, products and materials used for ordinary commercial and conventional military means. However, these resources could also be used for developing, manufacturing and deploying chemical weapons, the department said.

In signing the CWC, South Africa had honoured its national and international responsibilities and its commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament.

U.S. 'Stirring Up Trouble' in Relations With PRC*HK3108102493 Hong Kong WEN WEI PO in Chinese
31 Aug 93 p 11*

["Special article" by Xu Simin (1776 0934 3046), member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: "What Is the Purpose of the United States in Stirring Up Trouble"?]

[Excerpt] The United States has stirred up much trouble recently, the purpose of which is to deal with China. Let us keep aside previous issues for the time being. A recent issue is the case of the "Yinhe." A U.S. naval vessel has been so flagrant as to inspect this Chinese commercial ship. On which provision of international law is this based? Which provision of international law has authorized the United States to do so? If a country can search another country's commercial ship by maritime hegemonism, there will be great disorder under heaven. Another recent issue is China's sale of short-range missiles to Pakistan. China and Pakistan time and again have explained this problem to the United States, clarifying that the relevant sale does not violate arms limitation agreements. The United States, however, has outrageously announced economic sanctions against China and Pakistan, without presenting any reliable evidence or proposing consultations.

On arms sales, please do not forget that the United States is the world's number-one arms-exporting country. In regions and countries around the world where there are wars, there are U.S. weapons, and these weapons are used to frenziedly slaughter innocent people every day. What restrictions have been imposed on the United States? Now even the United Nations is suspected of being manipulated by the United States. On many occasions, the United States has usurped the UN name in trampling on others' sovereignty. Sometimes, however, it also does what it likes by keeping the United Nations aside.

On Chinese-U.S. bilateral relations, the United States recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, but in selling F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan it violated the relevant Chinese-U.S. agreement. [passage omitted]

Aircraft Purchase Issue, Ukraine-Taiwan Ties Viewed*OW0809042893 Beijing XINHUA in English
0408 GMT 8 Sep 93*

[Text] Kiev, September 7 (XINHUA)—Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stressed the need here today to develop the traditional friendship and economic ties with Ukraine.

When meeting with Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yefim Efim Zvyagilski, Qian said that China and Ukraine which have maintained traditional ties of friendship and cooperation, have great potential for

further development of such ties in all fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Zvyagilski said that Ukraine would like to cooperate with China in science and technology, transformation of old enterprises and the exploitation of minerals.

Qian told a news conference after his talks with Ukrainian leaders this afternoon that China and Ukraine had signed several agreements, but the implementation of these agreements needed additional measures from both sides, for which the Sino-Ukrainian economic mixed committee would meet within the year. The two countries would take steps to strengthen their exchanges in science, technology and culture.

He said that the China Red Cross would provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine to help remove the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear station accident.

Trade value between the two countries had increased, amounting to 220 million U.S. dollars in the first half of this year against the 223 million dollar figure for the whole of last year, Qian said.

When asked about the possible military ties between China and Ukraine, Qian said the two sides did not discuss cooperation in the military field. The reports about China's purchase of Ukraine's aircraft carrier were totally groundless, he pointed out.

Asked to comment on Ukraine's stand on the strategic arms reduction treaty, the Chinese foreign minister said that Ukraine had already announced that it would adopt a non-nuclear policy which would benefit regional and world peace. He expressed the belief that it would be a matter of time for Ukraine to ratify the first stage of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Qian revealed that China had reiterated to Ukraine its principled position on nuclear weapons and the pledge that China would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or regions.

On Ukrainian-Taiwan relations, Qian said President Leonid Kravchuk had stated in a joint communique signed during his visit to China last year that Ukraine recognizes China as the sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

He praised Ukraine's position on the Taiwan issue which was reconfirmed during the talks. China would not oppose Ukraine's unofficial and nongovernmental trade and economic ties with Taiwan, Qian said.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, who was also present at the press conference, told reporters that the basic policy the Ukrainian Parliament adopted not long ago specified that Ukraine would give priority to China in developing its relations with the Asian-Pacific countries.

Reportage on 'Yinhe' Cargo Ship

'Yinhe' Leaves Saudi Arabia for UAE

OW0709021993 Beijing XINHUA in English
0204 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Riyadh, September 6 (XINHUA)—The Chinese "Yinhe" cargo ship left Damman Port, Saudi Arabia, today for Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, to unload its cargo, after an inspection proved groundless the U.S. accusation that the ship was carrying banned chemicals.

As of July 23, the United States had accused the "Yinhe" of carrying chemical weapon precursors, thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride, bound for Iran. U.S. warships subsequently tailed the Chinese ship on the high seas and its military aircraft took aerial photos of the ship, interrupting the ship's normal navigation.

Since 2 August, the "Yinhe" had been forced to drift on the high seas for 24 days, inflicting much suffering to the crew. The ship had to change its course and delay its unloading schedule and this caused heavy economic losses to the Chinese side.

From 26 August to 4 September, representatives from Saudi Arabia and China and those from the United States, as technical advisers to the Saudi side, conducted an inspection of the ship in Damman.

The results of the exhaustive inspection showed that the Chinese ship did not carry at all thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride. The representatives of the three sides signed the inspection report and confirmed the results.

'Yinhe' Unloads Cargo in UAE, Departs for Home

OW0909035893 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1603 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Article by reporters Chen Wenru (7115 2429 1172) and Jiao Yensheng (3542 3601 3932)]

[Text] Beijing, 8 Sep (XINHUA)—The Chinese ocean-going cargo ship "Yinhe" left Dubai, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], to begin its homeward voyage this afternoon after unloading its cargo, including all 515 containers to be sent to Iran, at Dubai port.

The "Yinhe" set sail from Damman port, Saudi Arabia, on 6 September. It entered Dubai's Lashide [name as published] port—the largest modern port for transshipment and with container wharves in the Middle East—on the night of 7 September. When it entered the port, UAE citizen Salimu Layisi [name as published], who is the agent for the China Ocean Shipping Company in Dubai and president of the Layisi Shipping Company, boarded the ship to greet the crew with a basketful of fresh flowers.

Yang Shanzhun, charge d'affaires ad interim at the Chinese Embassy in the UAE, and Gao Daozhou, Chinese consul general in Dubai, also boarded the "Yinhe" with flowers and fruit to express sympathy for the 38

crew members who suffered much hardship for more than 20 days, having had to put up with high temperatures of 40 to 50 degrees Celsius.

When Consul General Gao Daozhou inquired about the health of the crew members, Captain Zhang Rude said: Although the crew members were very tired, when the inspection showed that the ship was not carrying the two chemical weapons precursors thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride, as alleged by the United States, and the U.S. side accordingly had no choice but to endorse the "inspection report," every one of them felt proud, elated, heartened, and completely seized with a sense of pride as a member of the Chinese crew.

Captain Zhang told our reporters that if all goes smoothly, the "Yinhe" will arrive at the new port in Tianjin on 24 September. He added: The "Yinhe" will leave immediately after loading at the new port and will return to the Gulf route.

Since its arrival in the Gulf of Oman on 2 August, the "Yinhe" had been drifting on the high seas for 24 days, being unjustifiably stalled by the United States, which accordingly caused enormous economic losses.

Report Provides Details on 'Yinhe' Incident

OW0609040693 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1311 GMT 5 Sep 93

["Newsletter" by reporter Liu Yegang (0491 0048 0474):
"The Whole Story of the 'Yinhe' Incident"]

[Text] Beijing, 5 Sep (XINHUA)—It was 4 September 1993. The port of Damman, Saudi Arabia.

After 10 days of hard work, members of the Chinese and Saudi Arabian inspection groups participating in inspecting cargoes carried by the Chinese freighter "Yinhe" and U.S. experts participating in the inspection as technical advisers of the Saudi side completed inspection of all the cargoes carried by the "Yinhe." With a completely different frame of mind, the head of the Chinese inspection group Sha Zukang, Saudi representative 'Abdallah [names as transliterated], and U.S. technical adviser Maclean put their signatures on the final inspection report, which said: "A complete inspection of the containers carried by the 'Yinhe' shows that it was not carrying the two types of chemicals—thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride. The U.S. Government undertakes to inform the governments of the countries which the Chinese cargo ship 'Yinhe' had been scheduled to call of the results of this inspection and to seek to ensure a smooth entry of the ship into the ports concerned to unload its cargo."

Now, the truth about the allegation that the Chinese cargo ship "Yinhe" was carrying dangerous chemical weapons to Iran has finally come to light.

Since 3 August the Chinese cargo ship "Yinhe," which had been conducting normal international commercial shipping, had been wrongly accused and subjected to

humiliation and had been forced to suspend normal shipping for three days. The incident aroused the concern of the Chinese people. The incident appeared to begin to subside after the inspection report finally proved that the "Yinhe" was clean. However, many questions still remain in people's minds: What happened in the "Yinhe" incident? Why has this ordinary cargo ship caused such an uproar in the world? Why has this incident lasted such a long time? What conclusions can people draw from the incident?

With these questions in mind, this reporter recently interviewed separately relevant officials who were directly responsible for and who directly participated in handling the "Yinhe" incident. The following is the inside story of the incident:

Weakness Lends Wings to Rumors

On 23 July, officials of the U.S. Embassy in China requested an emergency meeting with officials of the International Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, declaring: The U.S. side has obtained accurate intelligence to the effect that the Chinese cargo ship "Yinhe" departed from the port of Dalian on 15 July and is heading for 'Abbas, Iran, with a load of thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride—materials for making chemical weapons. The U.S. Government demanded [yao qiu 6008 3061] that the Chinese Government immediately adopt measures to stop the export of these materials. Otherwise, the United States will impose sanctions against China according to U.S. law. While making further representations with the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 3 August, the U.S. side, going so far as to ignore the basic principle of nonviolation of state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, demanded that the Chinese Government either order the return of the ship to its port of departure, or allow Americans to go aboard the ship and conduct an inspection to verify whether the ship carried the above mentioned chemicals, or order the ship to stop at a certain place and allow Americans to do as they pleased [ting ping fa luo 8126 0417 4099 5507].

In fact, before the United States made representations with the Chinese Government, or since 1 August, two U.S. warships had already started to follow the "Yinhe" at a distance of two nautical miles on both sides of the Chinese ship. U.S. warplanes had also continually circled over the Chinese ship to conduct reconnaissance and take aerial photos. The harassment by the U.S. warships and warplanes severely interrupted the normal navigation of "Yinhe." On 3 August the Chinese ship had to temporarily suspend its advance by dropping anchor on the high seas at a place some 10 nautical miles off the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile, the United States informed the Gulf countries of the above-mentioned exaggerated "intelligence." The Western media vigorously played up the U.S. "discovery." At the beginning they said the "Yinhe" was carrying sensitive chemicals and then they said it was

carrying a full load of chemical weapons. They even said the ship was carrying nuclear weapons. It seemed the "Yinhe" had become a "plague" ship.

Extensive Investigation

The Americans described their "intelligence" as "absolutely accurate." Although China has clear and definite regulations on banning and restricting chemicals of this category, it did not make a hasty and immediate denial. Instead, it took a serious attitude toward the issue. China's concerned departments conducted a 12-day serious, extensive, and comprehensive investigation on the "Yinhe" ship and its cargo, and found out the details of the ship's situation.

The results of investigation proved that the U.S. "intelligence" was full of self-contradictions. Let us talk about the ship first. "Yinhe" is a regular container ship of the Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Company of China, plying a Middle East route between the ports of Tianjin New Port, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jakarta, Dubai, Damman, and Kuwait. It left Tianjin New Port for Shanghai on 7 July, and left Shanghai for Hong Kong on 12 July. It was originally scheduled to arrive in Dubai on 3 August after stopovers in Jakarta and Singapore. This shows that it was absolutely impossible for the ship to set sail from Dalian, nor did it plan to sail to any Iranian ports. The United States said that the destination of "Yinhe" was Iran's 'Abbas Port. In fact, that port has no container piers at all. What can "Yinhe" do there? Next, let us talk about the cargo. The departments concerned have thoroughly checked the shipping bill and the bill of lading of "Yinhe" and verified them with the cargo owners. Thirty containers were indeed bound for Iran, but they contained mainly stationery, metal fittings, machinery spare parts, and dyestuff, which, together with 80 percent of the ship's other cargo, were scheduled to be unloaded in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, before being transshipped to Iran. There was no trace of the thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride which the U.S. side alleged the ship was carrying. The United States has a very strong intelligence force, and it is said that it could "detect anything." However, its so-called "accurate intelligence" on "Yinhe" proved poor, and it is indeed amazing that U.S. policymakers have gone so far as to believe it so firmly.

As for the two chemicals, thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride, according to chemists, thiodiglycol is a colorless transparent liquid like syrup, and it is a raw material mainly for making preservatives, insecticide, herbicide, dyestuff for cotton textiles, and ball pen ink. Thionyl chloride is a colorless or light yellowish liquid, and it is mostly used in making organic synthetics, dyestuff, agricultural drugs, and other medicines. Some countries had used these two chemicals for military purposes, such as making mustard gas and other agents for chemical warfare. The "Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons" signed last January stipulates that the transfer of these two chemicals should be subject to control. According to

responsible persons of the Chinese departments concerned, China formulated as early as in 1990 measures banning and restricting such chemicals. Therefore, it was absolutely impossible for a so-called large quantity of thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride to be on board "Yinhe" cargo ship.

Stern Representations

On 4 August, Chinese Foreign Ministry informed the United States of the results of our investigation, pointed out to the U.S. side that its intelligence was highly inconsistent with facts, and made stern representations [yan zheng jian she 0917 2973 0074 3195] with the U.S. side. It pointed out to the United States that China has always assumed a prudent and responsible attitude toward chemical exports, has formulated extremely stringent measures to control its chemical exports and has never exported the chemicals, technology, and equipment which can be used for making chemical weapons. It is utterly unjustifiable that the United States, for no reason, had alleged that Chinese cargo ship "Yinhe" was shipping two precursors of chemical weapons to Iran, and had blatantly interfered with the ship's normal commercial navigation. The Chinese side also asked the U.S. side to immediately stop obstructing and disturbing the "Yinhe" so as to ensure that the ship could dock and unload its cargo at the ports concerned.

However, the false intelligence of the United States and its hegemonist practice [ba quan zhu yi zuo fa 7218 2938 0031 5030 0254 3127] have already caused serious consequences [yan zhong hou guo 0917 6850 0683 2654]. As the "Yinhe" was compelled to stay adrift on the high seas in the Gulf region, it began to suffer serious fuel and water shortages and needed immediate resupplies. On the evening of 4 August, after repeated efforts to make representations and arrangements, the United Arab Emirates generously extended help by sending a tugboat with 60 metric tons of fuel and 60 metric tons of water for the Chinese ship. However, the United States went so far as to describe this as an Iranian ship heading for the "Yinhe" and warned the Chinese ship against entering the Iranian Port.

Because of the U.S. obstructions, the "Yinhe" could not obtain permission to enter the ports concerned to unload its goods on time. On 7 August, Qin Huasun, assistant minister of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, was ordered to summon U.S. Ambassador to China Stapleton Roy to an emergency meeting at which he lodged a strong protest against the hegemonic act [7218 6670 5887 3634] taken by the United States against the "Yinhe." Qin Huasun stressed that in international relations it is a violation of international laws and of the norms governing international relations to take action against a sovereign country on the basis of unreliable so-called intelligence. The action taken by the U.S. side has gratuitously damaged China's international image, interfered with normal shipping by Chinese ships, interrupted normal relations and trade contacts between sovereign countries, caused serious economic losses to the Chinese side, seriously

threatened the safety of the Chinese ship and its crew members, and cast a new shadow over Sino-U.S. relations. The Chinese side strongly demanded [yao qiu 6008 3061] that the U.S. side immediately adopt measures to ensure that the "Yinhe" smoothly enter port to unload its goods according to the original schedule, that the U.S. side bear responsibility and pay compensation for the consequences and losses caused by its unreasonable act, and that it ensure that in the future it will not interfere in the normal shipping and commercial activities of Chinese merchant ships.

Despite repeated serious representations made by the Chinese side, the U.S. still stubbornly stuck to its so-called "intelligence." On 12 August, a high-ranking official of the U.S. side said: "We have reliable intelligence to prove that the ship ('Yinhe') carried chemical weapons. We are determined to inspect the ship."

In order to clarify the truth of the matter to the international community, bring about an early solution to the issue of the "Yinhe" being obstructed, avoid further serious losses by the Chinese side and by the goods owners, and alleviate the sufferings of the "Yinhe" seamen, the Chinese side proposed to the U.S. side on 4 August that an inspection of the cargo on the ship be conducted by a third country and the Chinese side. With efforts being made by various sides, the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia agreed to allow the Chinese ship to dock at the Damman Port and send representatives to join the Chinese inspection group in inspecting the "Yinhe." The United States would also send experts to join in the inspection as the Saudi side's technical advisers. After drifting on high seas for 22 days, the "Yinhe" finally arrived at Saudi Arabia's Damman Port to await inspection.

Storm Over Cargo Inspection

On 26 August, the inspectors from the Saudi, Chinese, and U.S. sides arrived at the Zukorol [name as transliterated] Naval Base near the Port of Damman. The first round of talks by the three sides was held, presided over by Commodore Yintulaxing [name as transliterated], commander of the naval base and the chief representative of the host country. After the Saudi side proposed the draft inspection procedures, the three sides reached agreement after nine hours of negotiations: Going over the statement of goods on the "Yinhe"; finding out the cargo destined for Iran; carrying out an external inspection of the goods; and the containers in doubt may be unloaded and opened for inspection; after the inspection has been completed, the three sides will sign and publish the report of inspection.

The representatives of the three sides arrived at the dock on the morning of 28 August. When the inspection began, it was past 10:00 and the temperature under the sunlight was 65 degrees centigrade. Some of the U.S. personnel, who for the first time had a chance to inspect

a Chinese ship in so many years, wore desert camouflaged clothing while others wore gas masks. They carried different kinds of equipment in their hands and acted as if they were about to verify their "intelligence." When the first container destined for Iran was opened, there were lead-sealed drums painted with black lacquer. The Americans were wild with joy, but when the drums were opened, they discovered that there were dyestuffs of different colors. After that, 23 containers bound for Iran were opened, but they only contained stationery, metal fittings, and machinery spare parts which were exactly what the Chinese told them in Beijing. There was no trace of the two chemicals the U.S. side had been looking for.

Such inspection results were evidently not what the U.S. side had hoped for. Facing the results, U.S. experts began to be at their wits' end. In order to prove the accuracy of their intelligence, they proposed to expand the scope of inspection and inspected six containers transhipped from Hong Kong. U.S. inspectors, despite their capacity only as technical advisers to Saudi Arabia, personally took a hand in searching the containers. Again, they found nothing. Then, at the request of the U.S. side, 19 containers with destinations of other than Iran were also inspected. The results were the same. From then on, the U.S. side took samples from all liquid cargo stored in drums and sent them to labs for analysis. To show the importance they attached to the lab test, all test agents were delivered from U.S. warships. Nevertheless, the test results made the Americans even more embarrassed. Someone joked that if the Americans found any Coca-Cola on board, they would also send it to labs for test.

More and more containers were opened and inspected, but the Americans still found nothing. However, they were not reconciled to the inspection results, nor were they ready to accept the reality. They went so far as to unilaterally tear up the agreement reached by the three parties and unreasonably demanded the inspection of all the cargo on board, including the cargo dispatched from other countries.

Chinese inspectors asked the U.S. side for justification of the expanded inspection. The U.S. side could not produce any evidence, except for repeatedly saying that "Washington firmly believes that those two kinds of chemicals are on board." A responsible person of the U.S. side eventually said "bluntly" that Washington, even without any evidence, had suspicion of the cargo on board the "Yinhe," including the cargo from Japan, Singapore, and other countries. They threatened that they would not accept the outcome of the inspection unless all the cargo was checked by the U.S. side.

On 1 September, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials immediately summoned U.S. Embassy officials, made representations on U.S. act of going back on its own words and its breach of faith, unequivocally expressed our position of opposing U.S. inspection of the cargo from other countries, and requested the U.S. side to bear responsibility for all consequences arising from such an

inspection. At the same time, the U.S. side was requested to: (1) make a written confirmation of the results of inspection which had been completed so far; namely, to confirm that those chemicals alleged by the U.S. side were not found in the 49 containers dispatched from China; and (2) promise to join the representatives of China and Saudi Arabia in signing a joint inspection report after inspecting the cargo on the "Yinhe."

The Truth Has Been Brought to Daylight

To prevent the U.S. side from provoking new incidents and disavowing the inspection results, the responsible person of Chinese inspection team proposed that daily inspection record be reconfirmed and signed by the three parties. Under the pressure of justice, the U.S. side had to accept the proposal. From then on, the column of thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride on the daily inspection check-off lists was invariably marked with the word "none," and the signatures of the representatives of the three parties, in different language, appeared at the bottom of daily inspection record.

On 4 September, the last container, the 782d one, on the "Yinhe" was inspected, with the same results as the first one.

The last gleam of hope of the United States, which had attempted to seize some evidence to damage China's reputation under the pretense of preventing chemical weapons proliferation, was completely shattered.

On the same day, the representatives of China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, signed the inspection report for all the cargo.

In the present day of the 1990s, a nation like the United States, which labels itself as a nation upholding "law" and "democracy," has gone so far as to do whatever it wishes in the world. If it continues to do this way, then how many more ordinary cargo ships like the "Yinhe" would be subject to the same sufferings again? Will generally acknowledged truth still be recognized in this world?

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on 'Yinhe' Incident

OW0409183193 Beijing XINHUA in English
1758 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Text] Beijing, September 4 (XINHUA)—The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement here today on the "Yinhe" incident. Following is the whole text of the statement.

From 26 August to 4 September 1993, the representatives of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in the presence of the representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China, conducted an inspection of the cargo carried by the Chinese ship "Yinhe" at the Dammam Port, Saudi Arabia. Technical experts dispatched by the United States Government took part in the entire process of the inspection as advisors to the

Saudi side. The results of this exhaustive inspection showed that the Chinese ship "Yinhe" did not carry at all thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride, the two chemicals as alleged by the U.S. side. The representatives of the three sides signed the inspection report and confirmed the above-mentioned results. The Chinese Government extends its appreciation and gratitude to the Saudi Government for its cooperation in the settlement of the "Yinhe" issue.

The "Yinhe" incident is the sole making of the U.S. side as a result of its erroneous act based on its false intelligence. Since 23 July, the United States, on the ground of its intelligence, made several representations with the Chinese side. It accused the Chinese ship "Yinhe" of carrying chemical weapon precursors, thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride, bound for Iran, and took such extraordinary actions as having the Chinese ship on the high seas followed by its warships and taken aerial photos of by its military aircraft, which interrupted the ship's normal navigation. Moreover, the U.S. side also spread its misleading information to countries whose ports the "Yinhe" was scheduled to call, and demanded that they refuse to let the ship dock and unload its cargo.

After a serious and extensive investigation into the matter to lull the U.S. suspicions, the Chinese side informed the U.S. side as early as 4 August in explicit terms that the ship "Yinhe" did not carry the two chemicals as alleged by the U.S. side and put forth a positive proposal for a third-party inspection. However, the U.S. chose to ignore the Chinese clarification and stuck to its erroneous position, thus denying a solution to this problem for a long time. The "Yinhe" was compelled to stay adrift on the high seas for more than twenty days with its crew suffering from a shortage of fresh water, food and drinking water. This ship had to change its course and delay its unloading schedule, which caused heavy economic losses to the Chinese side. To demonstrate to the international community its sincerity for a settlement of the question, clarify the incident, bring about an earlier solution to the issue to avoid further losses, and alleviate the sufferings of the "Yinhe" seamen at an earlier date, the Chinese side proposed for an inspection by a third party of the cargo of the ship that the U.S. side is questioning about. However, none of the above-mentioned chemicals has been found in the inspected containers. And the U.S. side, going back on its own words, tore up the agreement that had already been reached and raised time and again the unreasonable demand of expanding the range of the inspection to the extent of checking all the cargo in 782 containers loaded on the ship including the cargo dispatched from other countries, which had prolonged the inspection again and again. Nonetheless, facts are facts. The results of the exhaustive inspection at the Dammam Port show that the truth has been brought to the daylight, and the United States, which was the sole maker of the "Yinhe" incident, has ended up in its own failure.

In the course of this incident, the United States has acted in an utterly indiscreet and irresponsible manner as it provided its so-called "intelligence" to the various parties even before it had got the basic facts about the Chinese ship straight. When the Chinese side, after careful investigation into the matter, made clear to the U.S. side that the "Yinhe" did not carry the two chemicals, the U.S. side, insisting on having its way, continued to misguide the public opinion and put pressure on the countries concerned. Recently, the U.S. has so often wilfully brought pressure to bear on other countries on the ground of its so-called "intelligence" which was no more than hearsay or self-invented stories. This is a show of hegemonism and power politics pure and simple. The "Yinhe" incident is only one example in this regard.

According to the universally recognized international law and international practices, it is the sovereign right of each and every country to conduct normal maritime shipping and foreign trade, which brooks no obstruction and interference from any country. But the United States has gone so far as to send warships and military aircraft to follow, monitor and harass the "Yinhe". It made many absurd demands including one that would require China to recall the ship to its port of departure. All this has obstructed its normal shipping operation. These acts of the United States have seriously infringed upon China's sovereignty and its right to freedom of navigation in international waters, which constitutes a blatant contempt of the norms governing international relations.

The chemical weapons convention will not become effective until at least 1995, and its verification mechanism is yet to be established. The United States, till this very day, has not ratified the convention. And no international organization has ever empowered the U.S. to conduct unilateral inspection of other countries. People cannot help wondering what legal basis the U.S. has got to justify its actions. If such behavior of self-styled "world cop" is to be condoned, can there still be justice, sovereign equality and normal state-to-state relations in this world?

As a signatory to the CW [Chemical Warfare] Convention, China is very serious about its international obligations thereunder. Despite the fact that the convention has yet to take effect, China has committed itself publicly not to produce or possess chemical weapons, nor does it export chemical products that may be used for the purpose of making chemical weapons. In order to ensure that the chemicals it exports will not be used for chemical weapons, the Chinese Government has formulated extremely stringent measures to control its chemical export. As to the two chemicals referred to by the U.S. side, the Chinese Government has clear-cut orders against their export to certain regions. The Chinese Government will, as always, strictly observe its international obligations and make its contribution to safeguarding international peace and security and promoting normal economic and trade exchanges among countries.

The "Yinhe" incident has incurred heavy losses to China both politically and economically. China strongly demands that the U.S. take immediate steps to remove the adverse consequences of its false intelligence and ensure, as it has already promised, that the "Yinhe" be allowed to enter its scheduled ports for unloading. China also demands that the U.S. side make a public apology to the Chinese side and compensate for all the financial losses sustained by the Chinese side. The United States should commit itself in explicit terms to strict compliance with international law and norms governing international relations in future handling of its relations with other states and guarantee against recurrence of similar incidents.

Text of NPC Statement on 'Yinhe' Incident

OW0609172093 Beijing XINHUA in English
1658 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] Beijing, September 6 (XINHUA)—The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) today issued a statement on the "Yinhe" incident. The following is the full text of the statement:

Beginning on July 23, the United States made groundless accusations against the Chinese cargo ship "Yinhe," alleging that it was transporting chemical weapon precursors, triodiglycol and thionyl chloride, to Iran. It sent warships and military aircraft to harass the ship on the high seas and wilfully spread slanderous rumors. As a result, the "Yinhe" could not call at scheduled ports to unload its cargo. What is more, the United States stubbornly refused to accept the clarifications made by the Chinese Government on the basis of a serious and responsible investigation into the matter, and insisted on having its own way. The complete inspection of the ship in Damman, Saudi Arabia, has shown that the "Yinhe" was not carrying at all the two chemicals as alleged by the United States. Thus, the U.S. scheme has ended in failure before the ironclad facts.

In this incident, the United States grossly infringed upon China's sovereignty and violated the right to freedom of navigation on the high seas and brutally trampled on international law and the norms guiding international relations. It also seriously damaged China's reputation and caused heavy economic losses to China. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC is greatly indignant at and strongly condemns the hegemonic acts of the United States, and fully supports the strong protest lodged by the Chinese Government on 7 August at the U.S. side and the statement it issued on 4 September. The Committee strongly demands that the U.S. side take immediate steps to remove the adverse consequences of its false intelligence, make a public apology to the Chinese side and compensate for all the economic losses sustained by China.

Recently, U.S. Government officials as well as some congressmen have on quite a number of occasions expressed their wish to improve and develop Sino-American relations. However, they must be well aware that requires more trust by the U.S. in other countries and no more trouble-making to the Sino-U.S. relations.

The United States must change over to new ways, abandoning hegemonism and power politics, undertaking to abide by international law and the norms governing international relations in future international contacts and guaranteeing not to let similar incidents occur again.

The Chinese people have all along attached importance to the Sino-U.S. relationship and is always ready to maintain and develop the friendly relations with the American people. But they will never allow anyone to infringe upon China's sovereignty and its rights and interests, and to tarnish China's dignity and its international reputation.

'Yinhe' Incident Allegedly Cost Company \$12.93 Million

OW0409223793 Beijing XINHUA in English
1717 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Text] Damman, Saudi Arabia, September 4 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Government representative said here today that a complete inspection of the Chinese cargo ship "Yinhe" had shown conclusively that the two banned chemicals, triodiglycol and thionyl chloride, were not being carried on it.

A statement issued by Sha Zukang, head of a Chinese group charged with inspecting the "Yinhe," said that during the period between 26 August and 4 September, the representatives of the government of Saudi Arabia inspected, in the presence of the representatives of the Chinese Government, the cargo carried by the Chinese ship "Yinhe," at the Damman Port of Saudi Arabia.

The representatives of the U.S. Government participated in the inspection as technical advisors to the Saudi side.

The complete inspection of all the containers aboard the "Yinhe" showed conclusively that the two chemicals, triodiglycol and thionyl chloride, were not among the ship's cargo, Sha said.

The U.S. Government undertakes to inform the governments of the countries which the Chinese ship "Yinhe" had been scheduled to call of the results of this inspection and to seek to ensure a smooth entry of the ship into the ports concerned to unload its cargo, he added.

Sha, the deputy director of the Department of the International Organizations and Conferences under the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stressed that the representatives of China, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. representatives as advisers of Saudi side have signed respectively the inspection report with the above-mentioned content. "Thus the whole truth about the 'Yinhe' incident has come to light. The Chinese cargo ship 'Yinhe' has been proved entirely innocent. The intelligence which served as the basis of U.S. allegation that 'Yinhe' carried the said two chemicals has been proved completely wrong," the statement said.

"The 'Yinhe' incident, which was the sole making of the United States, unwarrantedly harmed the credibility of China in the world. And the China Ocean Shipping Company estimated that the company suffered a serious economic loss of \$12.93 million, because 'Yinhe' was forced to drift on the high seas for as long as 24 days and changed its course and its offloading was delayed. The Chinese side has every reason to demand that the U.S. side apologize in public, compensate its loss and pledge not to create such incident in the future," the statement added.

"It should be pointed out that the CW [Chemical Weapons] Convention has not entered into force, the inspection machinery provided for under the convention has yet to be established, the United States has not ratified the convention to this date and it does not have the right to conduct its own inspection on other countries either," Sha said.

"Therefore, the erroneous actions taken by the U.S. side on the basis of its erroneous information has not only violated the basic norms of international law but also lack justification in terms of international law," he said.

In conclusion, the Chinese representative expressed his appreciation and thanks to the Saudi Government for the cooperation it has offered in the inspection of "Yinhe."

Pakistani Support Over 'Yinhe' Incident Reported

OW0709170393 Beijing XINHUA in English
1558 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Islamabad, September 7 (XINHUA)—Pakistan today condemned the harassment of Chinese "Yinhe" ship by U.S. Forces, saying it is a regrettable and unjustifiable incident.

Expressing deep concern over the matter, a foreign office spokesman said here that harassment of the "Yinhe" ship, obstruction of its passage to the destination and insistence on the search of its cargo involved multiple violation of the international law.

The inspection of the cargo exposed the baselessness of allegation that the ship was carrying chemicals to be used for its production of weapons and led to the conclusion that the U.S. intelligence information was not reliable, said the spokesman.

He said the principle of the freedom of the sea does not permit interference with the ships in international waters, nor does law allow any state to resort to unilateral action on the basis of suspicion in regard to the nature of cargo.

The spokesman expressed profound sympathy with China and the crew of the "Yinhe" who were subjected to prolonged inconvenience.

The government of Pakistan compliments the government of China for the restraint it showed in the incident, he added.

He also pointed out that it is on the basis of similarly incorrect information that the U.S. Government last month imposed unjustified sanctions against China and Pakistan alleging transfer of prohibited missile related technology exceeding MTCR [expansion unknown] criteria.

Hong Kong, Macao Dailies Cited on 'Yinhe' Incident

OW0609154793 Beijing XINHUA in English
1456 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] Hong Kong, September 6 (XINHUA)—Major newspapers here today highlighted the "Yinhe" incident, supporting China's position for apology and compensation from the United States and criticizing the U.S. for practicing hegemony and power politics.

In the incident, a Chinese ship, "Yinhe," was followed by U.S. war-ships and military aircraft and compelled to stay adrift on high seas for more than 20 days, because the U.S. had alleged the ship was carrying two chemical weapon precursors bound for Iran. But the inspectors found no such chemicals.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry demanded in a statement on Saturday [4 September] following the inspection that the U.S. make a public apology to the Chinese, compensate for all financial losses sustained by the Chinese and guarantee against similar incidents.

"All the demands the Chinese Foreign Ministry put forth in the statement are fair and reasonable, and the U.S. Government should make sincere response to them," said MING PAO daily news in a commentary today.

"It's not strange for the U.S. intelligence agency to make mistakes but it's very strange for the U.S. Government to take strong diplomatic actions on the basis of unreliable information," the commentary said.

"If such behavior of the self-styled 'world cop' is to be condoned, can there still be justice, sovereign equality and normal state to state relations in this world?" the commentary quoted the statement as saying. "This is a very good question," the commentary said.

A signed article in today's Hong Kong COMMERCIAL DAILY, which is entitled "Power Politics, Gangster Logic," said the U.S. behavior constitutes "a brutal trample on the sovereignty of another country."

HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL said in an article that what the United States has done in the "Yinhe" incident represents the typical violation of international laws and it is a typical case of violation of human rights.

The article pointed out that the U.S. had played a trick to divert the public attention from the "Yinhe" case by claiming that China helps Pakistan to make missile.

"This is an apparent fact," the article said.

The English SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST said it is "a grudging comment from the State Department to the effect that the incident was unfortunate." "The

United States must be embarrassed by its own mistake but that is no good reason for being so mean-spirited," the newspaper said.

Macao newspapers today also criticized the U.S. for pursuing hegemony and power politics and voiced support for the just position adopted by the Chinese Government in the "Yinhe" incident.

AUSTRALIA

Canberra Willing To Help Jakarta Develop Nuclear Program

*BK0109095793 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0800 GMT 1 Sep 93*

[Text] The Australian Government says it wants to help Indonesia develop a nuclear energy program of the highest international standard. Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans, said Indonesia would not buy a cheap reactor from the former Soviet Union but would get the most advanced reactor. Speaking before a parliamentary committee in Canberra, Senator Evans said the risks of an Indonesian nuclear program were not as severe or as substantial, as alleged by some critics. He said Australia was close to entering into a nuclear science and technology cooperation agreement with Indonesia. Signing of the agreement last year had been held up because Indonesia wanted a broader scientific agreement, which was now being negotiated. Senator Evans said Australia had a particular interest in understanding Indonesia's nuclear energy program. He said cooperation to pass on advance technology to developing countries was an important part of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

JAPAN

Aerospace Firms With U.S. Technology Seek Ties

*HK0109063993 Hong Kong THE STANDARD
in English 1 Sep 93 p 17*

[Report by Peta Firth]

[Text] Japanese aerospace companies with access to sensitive U.S. military technology including Patriot missiles and F-15 fighter jets will go to China next month to set up joint ventures with the Chinese Aerospace industry.

Around 30 executives from companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Kawajima-Harima Heavy Industries will visit Beijing, Xian and other Chinese cities from 18-25 September under the auspices of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies.

Andrew Blair-Smith, analyst at Barclays de Zoete Wedd in Tokyo, told The Standard that exporting military technology was against Japan's constitution and that technology non-disclosure agreements with U.S. partners were "rigorously enforced."

However, it was reported last week that Mitsubishi had broken Japan's embargo by selling banned electronic equipment to the former East Germany.

Japan has technology transfer agreements with U.S. defence suppliers Raytheon, McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics and Boeing.

Mitsubishi was developing Patriot missiles under licence from Raytheon and F-15s from McDonnell-Douglas for Japan's self-defence force Blair-Smith said. It was also working with General Dynamics on the FSX fighter aircraft.

The U.S. technology was for Japan's use and could not be offered to any joint venture. The Japanese Trade and Industry Department was attempting to co-ordinate a supersonic aircraft project with Japanese aerospace producers. If the project went ahead it would not be subject to the same non-disclosure agreements as technology licensed from the U.S.

Japanese companies were interested in cheap raw materials from China in order to counter the effects of the appreciating yen, Blair-Smith said.

"They are very keen to develop their purchasing from non-yen sources. Mitsubishi has already set up an affiliate company in China to buy shipbuilding materials and heavy machinery," he said.

Japanese aerospace producers were trying to expand into the civil aircraft market to circumvent the embargo on exporting military equipment.

"There is a huge market for civil aircraft development in China. Japanese companies want to take part in it."

Japan's Foreign Ministry and Trade and Industry Department had helped organise next month's exploratory mission to China. But Blair-Smith said the companies would have to fund any joint ventures in China themselves.

He predicted they would pay for the projects with share sales and through securing debts against assets in Japan.

Japanese aerospace manufacturers are also reported to be involved in negotiations to join a British Aerospace joint venture with Taiwan Aerospace to build passenger jets.

Plans To Work on Indefinite Extension of NPT

*OW0509092093 Tokyo KYODO in English
0906 GMT 5 Sep 93*

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 5 KYODO—Japan plans to ask nonaligned nations to back an indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) beyond 1995, Foreign Ministry sources said Sunday [5 September].

Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly session later this month, will refer to Japan's support for the plan, the sources said.

Out of the 158 NPT signatories, only about 50 countries have expressed support for its indefinite extension, far short of a majority needed to achieve the idea, the sources said.

Most nonaligned countries, mainly Asian and African nations, have not yet made their position clear toward the proposed extension, arguing the matter should be discussed in connection with nuclear disarmament and banning nuclear tests.

Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, South Korea, the United States and Japan are among the countries which have expressed support for the indefinite extension of the NPT.

To realize the indefinite extension, support from at least 80 countries is needed, the sources said.

The Foreign Ministry said nuclear nonproliferation is essential to the peace and safety of Japan and the rest of the world. It also considers unrealistic a plan to revise the treaty to remove discrimination among nuclear and nonnuclear powers.

Three preliminary meetings on the NPT extension are set for January and May 1994 and January 1995, followed by an international meeting at the U.N. Headquarters in New York from 17 April to 12 May in 1995.

NORTH KOREA

IAEA's Meyer Says That Duration of DPRK Talks Depend on Contents

SK3108103893 Seoul YONHAP in English
1022 GMT 31 Aug 93

[Text] Paris, Aug. 31 (YONHAP)—The talks between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and North Korea, begun on Tuesday in Pyongyang, would last depending on the substantial contents of negotiations, IAEA spokesman Hans Meyer said on Tuesday.

Meyer said the five members of the IAEA's negotiation team, who gathered in Beijing last weekend, had not made any report to the IAEA headquarters.

"Judging from the lack of report, we believe the talks began with North Korea on Tuesday as planned," he said.

The spokesman said he cannot foresee how long the current meeting would be held. "It may last longer or shorter than expected depending on the contents of the talks," Meyer said.

An official of the North Korean mission in Vienna said last week the IAEA team would stay in North Korea through 4 September.

Spokesman Meyer said the issue of whether to have a follow-up meeting in Vienna after the Pyongyang talks as suggested by the IAEA would be discussed along with other items at the current Pyongyang meeting.

He said he knows nothing about the exact topics taken up at the first-day meeting on Tuesday.

The IAEA hopes to discuss all matters related to the implementation of the nuclear safeguards agreement

whereas North Korea wants to take up initially the question of the IAEA's "impartiality."

Japanese Government To Pursue Talks With Government

SK3008014293 Seoul YONHAP in English
0130 GMT 30 Aug 93

[Text] Tokyo, Aug. 30 (YONHAP)—Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's coalition government is moving to resume talks with North Korea, discarding the Liberal Democratic Party government's precondition of a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, the TOKYO SHIMBUN reported on Monday.

The new government has never decided that it will not sit down with North Korea until the nuclear issue is completely solved, the newspaper quoted a ranking Foreign Ministry official as saying.

Pyongyang had suspended the talks, not Tokyo, he was quoted as saying.

The Hosokawa government is seeking to normalize relations with North Korea as part of settling Japan's responsibility in World War II and believes a prolonged suspension of talks would isolate North Korea from the international community and work against Japan's interest, the newspaper said.

Japan made solution of the nuclear issue a precondition for resuming the talks with North Korea, observing the progress of U.S.- North Korea talks and inter-Korean dialogue.

YONHAP Reports No Date Set for Third Round U.S.-DPRK Talks

SK0409022293 Seoul YONHAP in English
0215 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Text] Washington, Sept. 3 (YONHAP)—The third round of talks between the United States and North Korea on nuclear issues, expected in mid-September, is likely to be delayed at least until late this month.

Well-informed sources here said Friday no time has so far been fixed for the high-level meeting between Washington and Pyongyang.

Given the flow of the situation, the date of the meeting is likely to be determined following a board of governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) slated for 21-24 September, they said.

The sources said press reports that Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, the U.S. chief negotiator at the high-level talks, would fly directly to Switzerland for the talks with North Korea after visits to Seoul and Japan on 8-12 September were merely speculation at the moment.

"Unless there is a specific change in the situation such as rapid progress in inter-Korean dialogue, Gallucci will return to Washington after his Asian tour," one of the sources said.

A spokesman for the U.S. State Department said no time has been determined for the third-round U.S.-North Korea meeting.

He reiterated the U.S. position that, prior to another meeting with Pyongyang, there should be talks first between the IAEA and North Korea and between South and North Korea.

During the second-stage meeting, the U.S. made the initiation of negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea and the resumption of South-North dialogue prerequisites to third-stage talks with Pyongyang.

All in all, the sources said, the third-round talks would not take place in mid-September as initially expected in view of various developments of the recent past.

They noted that the recent IAEA-North Korea meeting ended on Sept. 3 without any progress and that it would take time to discuss procedural matters before the proposed exchange of special envoys is materialized between South and North Korea.

Even if the South-North dialogue were resumed, its outcome has to be watched before the time of the third-round meeting is determined, the sources said.

Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary Gallucci is expected to discuss with South Korean Government leaders multi-pronged ways to get North Korea to agree on IAEA inspections of their undeclared nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

During his visit, the two countries will also discuss the issue of whether to stage the Team Spirit military exercise next year and the question of economic cooperation with North Korea.

IAEA Inspections 'Unfair,' Impartiality Questioned

SK3108142893 Pyongyang Radio Pyonyang in Korean to South Korea 0752 GMT 31 Aug 93

[Unattributed talk: "Nuclear Threat Against Us Is a Grave Challenge to Korea and Asia and to the Peace of the World"]

[Text] The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: The issue of ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is directly related to the issue of ensuring peace and stability in the world. Peace and stability in the world is inconceivable without peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

As you know, peace is the most universal ideal of mankind. In particular, peace is most valuable to our nation.

If a war breaks out in our country, where the danger of a war has always hovered heavily, the existence of the nation will be jeopardized, not to speak of national reunification. Therefore, the issue concerning peace is the most urgent task that should be preferentially resolved for the sake of national reunification and wellbeing.

However, our country's situation is still tense because of the maneuvers made by the imperialists and reactionaries. As you know, under the pretext of our nonexistent nuclear issue, the imperialists and reactionaries have put a nuclear threat on us and they have persistently maneuvered to separate and stifle our Republic.

As it has already been known, the imperialists and reactionaries have threatened and pressed us under the pretext of the issue concerning nuclear inspections. Finally, they adopted the so-called resolution against us.

Under the pretext of the nonexistent nuclear issue, the maneuver of putting unfair pressure on our country, that does not possess nuclear weapons, is the manifestation of the arrogance of those who have been accustomed to ignoring the principle of justness and equality in international relations and those have been accustomed to forcing their unilateral will on others.

Because the United States has introduced nuclear weapons to South Korea and has threatened us through nuclear weapons, the nuclear issue has arisen on the Korean peninsula. If the United States had not introduced nuclear weapons to South Korea, the nuclear issue would not have arisen on the Korean peninsula.

The reason why the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has been a complex one is that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has lost its impartiality, following the lead of a big country, and has forced us to receive unfair special inspections.

In March, our Republic was forced to take the measure of withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Because of anti-Republic maneuvers by the imperialists and reactionaries, we could not help taking the self-defensive measure, under the circumstances in which we could not implement the duties pursuant to the treaty any more and in which the supreme interest of the nation was infringed upon.

As we have asserted repeatedly, we have neither the will nor the capability of producing nuclear weapons. The consistent position of our Republic is to turn the Korean peninsula into a nonnuclear peace zone. This position of ours was clearly proven once again in the recent DPRK-U.S. talks. Nevertheless, the imperialists and their followers are attempting to impose unjust pressure on our country with the nuclear issue. This is clearly the wanton infringement [nanpokhan chimhae] on the sovereignty of our republic, and a criminal act of aggravating tensions on the Korean peninsula. If nuclear war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, it will spread into a worldwide thermonuclear war.

A peaceful Korea is necessary for peaceful Asia and a peaceful world. Therefore, to crush [chitpushoborinungosun] the nuclear threat of the imperialists and the reactionaries against us is the fundamental problem to ensure peace in Korea, Asia, and the world.

The position and attitude taken toward the problem of crushing the nuclear threat of the imperialists and the reactionaries and turning the Korean peninsula into a nonnuclear peace zone, is the criterion that determines whether they want peace or not.

The proposal put forward by our Republic for turning the Korean peninsula into a nonnuclear peace zone is the just and fair proposal acceptable to everyone. Our Republic will make in the future every sincere effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula to reach the noble position of ensuring durable peace in our country, Asia, and the world.

We, the Korean people are the ones who are responsible for bringing to an end the danger of war and ensuring peace in this land. All the Korean people in the North, the South, and overseas should be united firmly and launch themselves into the struggle to crush the maneuvers of imperialists and reactionaries.

The imperialists and reactionaries should see the reality squarely and should not act foolishly.

Atomic Energy Ministry Comments on 1-3 Sep Talks With IAEA

*SK0809102993 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1021 GMT 8 Sep 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 8 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the DPRK Ministry of Atomic Energy, speaking in reply to a question put by KCNA today regarding the negotiation held some time ago between the delegations of the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said:

Negotiation was held between delegations of our country and the IAEA in Pyongyang from 1 to 3 September according to an agreement reached at the Geneva DPRK-U.S. talks.

At the negotiation the debate was focused on the partiality of the IAEA and other issues were also dealt with.

We raised the partiality of the IAEA and its unjust behavior against us as the main topic for discussion.

The IAEA delegation expressed some understanding as regards its partiality, but insisted on the resumption of ad hoc inspection.

We said that the inspection problem would be resolved automatically when the question of the agency's partiality is solved.

At the negotiation the IAEA side expressed its hope to resume the negotiation with us within two months.

In this regard, we told it that there is no change in our stand to continue the negotiation with it.

We are ready to continue negotiation.

Delegate's Speech on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

*SK0409012793 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0105 GMT 3 Sep 93*

[Text] Yi Chol, permanent representative of the DPRK to the UN office in Geneva and head of the DPRK delegation, spoke at the disarmament talks in Geneva.

He noted: We can describe it as historic that the disarmament meeting has decided to negotiate a treaty of overall nuclear test ban this year marking the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the partial nuclear test ban.

In view of the efforts and time spent for the realization of this objective, I think that the agreement reached is of great significance, though it is only a first step. Nuclear testing has many political and military implications and incalculable dangers. In fact, nuclear testing itself is the most dangerous nuclear arms race among the world powers, and it is becoming the basic source for nuclear proliferation [haek chonpa].

If the world fails to succeed in the permanent suspension of nuclear testing, the nuclear multi-polarization [haek tagukhwa], in which every nuclear possessing country has one pole, will become inevitable. The multi-polar competition for nuclear superiority will bring danger incomparable to that of the bipolar system of the cold war era.

The nuclear possessing countries may have perceived the pressing need for a complete nuclear test ban when the international public circles expressed active support for the tentative control of nuclear testing announced last year and its extension announced by the United States, France, and Russia this year.

Now some countries are making active moves to become permanent members of the UN Security Council. When we think of the fact that all of the five permanent member states are nuclear possessing states, a serious problem is raised to the international community by the fact that a country which has enough nuclear material and is capable of producing nuclear weapons at any time is making the moves with an intention of becoming a permanent member.

Our delegation fully supports the proposal made by the delegates to initiate without delay the negotiations for the total nuclear test ban treaty at present when the favorable conditions and environment are created and complete it by 1995.

Eliminating this threat is of vital importance for the nonnuclear states, particularly for the people of the countries of the region under direct nuclear threat. Although their demands for the creation of nonnuclear

zone, nonuse of nuclear weapons, and safeguards [anjon tambo] are reflected in a series of resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, the nuclear threat to them still continues.

The reality in which modern war means are available which are not subject to the limitations of geography, time, and space clearly stresses the validity of the multilateral and bilateral agreements of further legal binding force.

Our government and people have made all the possible efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat which is being imposed continuously for decades from land, sea, and air. I am referring to the talks between the DPRK and the United States of America held recently in connection with the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. In connection with the pressure put on our country under the pretext of fictitious nuclear suspicion, our delegation in the spring talks stated that this issue can be resolved only between our country and the United States, noting how the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula originated.

We believe that the historic DPRK-U.S. talks and the joint documents issued show many things as well as explain them. The first round of the talks held in New York in June were the talks in which the principled problems arising in resolving the nuclear issue and the pending issue between the DPRK and United States were raised. Also, the joint agreement issued by the DPRK and the United States is a significant pledge that becomes the first agreement in the history of DPRK-U.S. relations.

This agreement is a U.S. pledge that it will not use armed force, including nuclear weapons, nor pose a threat to the DPRK with those arms. Also, this agreement provides that denuclearization, peace, and security on the Korean peninsula must be guaranteed, that the two sides shall mutually respect each other's sovereignty, that they shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs, and that they shall support the peaceful reunification of Korea.

During the second round of the talks held in Geneva in July, the two sides discussed the practical measures to carry out principles set forth in the joint statement. One of the significant events in the Geneva talks was that our side put forward a proposal to replace the graphite speed reduction reactor system with a light-water reactor system.

This proposal reaffirms and further makes clear the DPRK Government's policy regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This proposal is also an expression of the firm will to completely resolve all nuclear suspicions of us.

The problem on how to deal with this firm proposal put forward by our government after taking protracted pains and numerous efforts to resolve the country's power

problem based on our own technology and resources is, rather than a technological and financial problem, a political problem which shows the basic attitude on whether there is the will to sincerely resolve the nuclear issue or not.

The United States, on the assumption that the solving of the issue of light-water moderated reactors can be realized as a measure for the ultimate resolution of the nuclear issue, has expressed its support for the introduction of the light-water moderated reactors and its willingness to study ways for it with the DPRK. [kyongsuro toibul chijihamyong, kurul wihan pangdorul choson minjujuui inmin konghwaguk kwa hamkke tamgual yonguirul pyomyonghayotta]

The implementation of the joint North-South declaration of denuclearization agreed upon between the North and the South in the resolution of the nuclear issue is one of basic problems and can be resolved only through dialogue.

The rupture of the North-South talks for the realization of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula shows that unless the political factors hindering progress in negotiations are completely eliminated the talks cannot bear due fruition.

The DPRK-U.S. talks have opened up a bright vista for the basic and final resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and provided a foundation in improving DPRK-U.S. relations. Thus, the talks have come to greatly contribute to alleviating tensions on the Korean peninsula—which is the most tense and dangerous area in the world—and to maintaining peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

The future talks will become more progressive and productive when each side performs its respective work in a sincere manner. If the commitments such as the guarantee of the nonuse of nuclear weapons and the suspension of threat by armed forces are put into practice the product of the Cold War will be eliminated forever on the Korean peninsula.

Spokesman's Statement on North-South Talks

SK0109010593 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2310 GMT 31 Aug 93

[Press statement by a spokesman for the North side delegation to the North-South high-level talks, on 31 August; place not given—read by announcer]

[Text] Three months have passed since our side put forward a proposal to exchange special envoys for the top leaders of the two sides. During this period, we proceeded from our desire to make a new breakthrough in North-South dialogue to repeatedly urge the South side to renounce its old attitude of confrontation and to accept our epochal proposal for exchanging special envoys.

On 9 August we again expressed our position that the pending issues, including the nuclear issue, be solved through exchanging special envoys of the two sides's top leaders, and not through working-level negotiations such as negotiations at the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, but the South side refused to accept our more dynamic [poda chokkuk-chok] proposal to exchange special envoys. There has been no sign of change in their confrontation, not dialogue-seeking attitude.

Wasting time only for antagonism and confrontation without dialogue in the face of the nuclear issue and other issues which await rapid resolution is not beneficial for all intents and purposes. It is also indeed heart rending from the national viewpoint.

Affirming our side's desire to rapidly settle the present deadlock in North-South relations and to make progress in North-South dialogue in harmony with the DPRK-U.S. talks which are being carried out properly [chohkae chujindoego itnun], I am authorized to assert that our consistent position is to rapidly resolve the issue on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through North-South dialogue. Our such position has already been confirmed at the DPRK-U.S. talks and has generated unanimous support and sympathy at home and abroad.

However, we regret that the South side, the other party to dialogue, while clamoring about the precedence of the solution to the nuclear issue over other issues, is running in another direction in actual behavior.

As we have already noted, while calling for efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, the South side conducted the Ulchi-93 training and the Ulchi Focus Lens joint military exercise that contradict the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before us. In addition, by releasing the one-sided announcement that it would conduct the Team Spirit nuclear war exercise, the South is deliberately aggravating the situation. In fact, this is not an attitude for resolving the nuclear issue, but behavior creating obstacles to it.

Worse still, the South side talks about international cooperation while implying that it intended to negotiate face to face with us on the issue. This proves that the South desires neither dialogue with us nor settlement of the nuclear issue. The South is only trying to create artificial obstacles in ongoing DPRK-U.S. talks, which they do not welcome.

The complicated course of North-South dialogue clearly shows the destructive [pagoejogin] effect on dialogue of the provocative large-scale test nuclear war exercise, which the South is conducting with outside forces against us, and the Cold War concept of confrontation which causes the South to be hostile to fellow countrymen in their excessive adherence to differences in ideology and systems.

Today, the internal and external situation concerning the Korean peninsula [chosonbandorul tulossan naewoe-jongse] faces a new turning point. North-South dialogue and detente on the Korean peninsula, the lost square of confrontation in the Cold War era, have been pushed onto the agenda as an urgent issue by progress in DPRK-U.S. talks [chomihoedamui chinjonun naengjonsidaewi majimak taegyoljangin chosonbandoui puknam-saiedo taehwawa vanhwarul cholpakhan munjero ilchonge cheghagoitta].

If the South fails to look straight at this change and continues to run counter to dialogue and peace by standing on an anticommunist and anti-North position of confrontation, it will only remain an orphan from the Cold War era.

In light of the serious lesson that North-South dialogue has given us in the past and the current situation which is developing toward detente, the South must free itself from the force of habit.

Proceeding from this position, we hold that the South side should express its clear attitude to stop all hostile nuclear war exercises against its fellow people, stop pursuing the so-called international cooperative system, and stop repeating acts that go against dialogue and peace.

The South side's expression of such an attitude will be a factor in showing the South side's progressive stance toward dialogue and an affirmative response to the exchange of special envoys of the two sides which all fellow countrymen are looking forward to.

If the South side shows a sincere attitude on any form of dialogue, we will not adhere to special-envoy level of talks.

If the South side, due to its own reason, cannot designate the deputy prime minister-level in charge of reunification issues as envoy, the exchange of special envoys of any level [imuiui kup], designated by the highest-level authorities of the two sides, will be acceptable.

These special envoys can comprehensively discuss and resolve the issue of urgently taking common measures to easing tension and implementing the North-South agreement, together with the issues of denuclearizing the nation, promoting the great unity of the whole country, and various others that are raised in realizing highest-level talks.

We hope that the South side will become our trustworthy dialogue partner for successful North-South dialogue and for solution of urgent, important pending problems like the denuclearization issue at an early date.

When the exchange of special envoys who are mutually trustworthy is realized between the North and the South, the nuclear issue and all other problems in North-South relations can be resolved promptly in accordance with the intention of the highest-level authorities of the two sides and our efforts for the nation's peace and peaceful reunification will no doubt bring about excellent fruition.

We hope that the South side will ponder our repeated proposals for exchange of special envoys and will show a turning point in its position at an early date with practical actions for the realization of the proposal.

Talks With U.S. Said To Be Going Well, ROK Criticized

SK0509040793 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0110 GMT 5 Sep 93

[Text] Son Song-pil, our country's ambassador to Russia, gave an interview to reporters of the Russian paper PRAVDA, the ITAR-TASS news agency, and Moscow radio in connection with reckless acts of the South Korean authorities who show dissatisfaction over the result of the DPRK-U.S. talks.

The ambassador gave details on the result of the two rounds of the DPRK-U.S. talks. He pointed out that the world's various countries and the peace-loving people support and welcome the result of the DPRK-U.S. talks and that they hope the talks continue successfully in the future.

Exposing that the South Korean authorities are staging every possible maneuver to hinder the DPRK-U.S. talks, he said: Not knowing of the intention of the United States, their master, the South Korean authorities have lost their balance and are running amok recklessly. In particular, the so-called South Korean puppet foreign minister made absurd remarks by saying that UN sanctions against North Korea are necessary, that North Korea should present concrete plans for completely clearing the nuclear suspicions, and so forth.

He continued: At a time when the DPRK-U.S. talks are proceeding successfully for the resolution of our country's nuclear issue, the South Korean authorities are making such remarks even when they are not entitled to cut in on the nuclear issue. This is nothing but a ridiculous act to throw a wet blanket on and to rupture the talks by any means. Why are so-called sanctions necessary when the nuclear issue is being smoothly resolved through the DPRK-U.S. talks? Notwithstanding, no matter how furiously the South Korean authorities try, sanctions will not be imposed on us anyway.

The ambassador added: The ones who run amok recklessly are due to sink into the depth of self-destruction. We will make every effort to ensure that the future DPRK-U.S. talks proceed favorably so that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula can be resolved from the origin."

After this, he answered the reporters' questions.

Proposals on Total Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Endorsed

SK0309103693 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1021 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Pyongyang, September 3 (KCNA)—The head of the DPRK delegation at the Geneva disarmament conference expressed full support to the proposals of foreign delegates to start negotiation on a treaty of total nuclear test ban without delay and conclude it by 1995.

Yi Chol, permanent representative of the DPRK to the United Nations office in Geneva, said in his speech that it could be assessed as a historical event that the disarmament conference agreed to negotiate a treaty of total nuclear test ban this year in which falls the 30th anniversary of the signing of the treaty on partial ban on nuclear tests.

In case of failure to put a permanent end to nuclear testing, nuclear multi-polarization will be inevitable, each nuclear state having its own pole, and multi-polar race for nuclear superiority will bring danger incomparable to the bipolar Cold War era, he warned.

The DPRK Government and people have made every possible effort to remove the nuclear threat that has been presented to them constantly for scores of years, he said, adding:

The joint statement issued at the end of the first-stage DPRK-USA talks held in New York in June was a significant commitment unprecedented in the history of relations between the DPRK and the United States.

Recalling that at the second-stage talks in July the DPRK offered to replace its system of graphite moderated reactors with that of light water moderated nuclear reactors, he said how to approach this positive offer of the DPRK Government is rather a political issue showing the fundamental stance of whether they have real intention to solve the nuclear problem or not, than being a technical and financial matter.

He noted that the issue of implementing the North-South joint declaration on denuclearisation could be solved only through dialogue.

Stressing that the DPRK-USA talks opened a vista for a fundamental and final solution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and laid the foundation for improving the DPRK-U.S. relations, he declared:

If each side sincerely carries out what it must do, the future talks will apparently become more progressive and productive, and if the commitments are put into practice, the product of the Cold War will disappear on the Korean peninsula for good.

KCNA Denies Reports of Uranium Ore Smuggling*SK0609110293 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1042 GMT 6 Sep 93*

["Rumor About 'Uranium Ore Smuggling'—Sheer Fabrication"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, September 6 (KCNA)—Radio No. 1 of South Korea, quoting a false report of the Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Ostankino, set afloat the groundless rumor that DPRK lumberjacks working in the Khabarovsk territory were "smuggling uranium ore out of Russia."

This is a groundless, sheer fabrication. An inquiry revealed that the DPRK lumberjacks even do not know if there is a uranium mine in the Far Eastern region of Russia. Therefore, it does not make sense that they are smuggling uranium ore out of the region.

The local people of Russia, either, do not know of such thing and they regard the report as utterly groundless. The Far Eastern local authorities of Russia have sent no official note to us in this regard.

It is well known a fact worldwide that the dignified DPRK which regards independence, peace and friendship as the basic idea of its foreign policy never allows such mean act as violating the law of other countries.

No sooner had the Ostankino broadcast the false report about "the smuggling of uranium ore" by DPRK lumberjacks, than the South Korean authorities accustomed to false propaganda quoted it as if they had been waiting for it. In this they foolishly try to impair the prestige of the dignified DPRK with the false rumor that the DPRK is manufacturing nuclear weapons with uranium ore stolen from the Far Eastern region of Russia and to use it as a political excuse for their anti-national, anti-reunification moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK with the clamor over "nuclear arms development."

They also seek a sinister purpose of driving a wedge between the DPRK and Russia and bringing to a rupture the joint timber production of the two countries.

The South Korean authorities, utterly dismayed at the successful progress of two stages of DPRK-USA talks, resort to such despicable smear campaign, prompted by a heinous scheme to isolate the DPRK internationally and stifle it at any cost.

The smear campaign of some paid trumpeters in South Korea and Russia against the DPRK will only invite ridicule and criticism from unbiased public opinion.

SOUTH KOREA**Vice Minister-Level Talks With DPRK on 7 Sep Proposed***SK0209080393 Seoul YONHAP in English
0755 GMT 2 Sep 93*

[Text] Seoul, Sept. 2 (YONHAP)—South Korea proposed Thursday working-level talks with North Korea on 7 September to discuss exchanging envoys.

Prime Minister Hwang In-song, in a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart, Kang Song-san, suggested that the two sides meet at 10 A.M. at Tongil-kak, a North Korean pavilion in the truce village of Panmunjom, to discuss practical aspects of the exchange.

Hwang proposed that each side send a two-man delegation headed by a vice minister-level official.

North Korea is likely to agree and the first inter-Korean meeting since the inauguration of the government in February, could be realized soon, according to an official at the National Unification Board (NUB).

Pyongyang proposed Wednesday an exchange of special envoys of any level appointed by the top leaders of their countries to discuss pending problems, including the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

"Our side proposes that the two Koreas exchange special envoys appointed by the top leaders of their countries to discuss and settle the nuclear problem first before dealing with other issues," Hwang said in his message.

At the working-level talks, such matters as how to ensure the personal safety of the envoys, the dates of the visits, agenda, who the envoys will meet, the size of entourage and other details are expected to be discussed.

"We hope that the exchange of special envoys will be realized as soon as possible... and I'd like to clarify that we are not in a hurry to realize an inter-Korean summit," Song Yong-tae, vice national unification minister, said.

Earlier Thursday, unification-related ministers discussed the exchanges and decide to send a minister-level envoy to North Korea after agreement is reached in working-level talks.

Pak Kwan-yong, chief presidential secretary, was mentioned as a possible envoy.

Journal Describes KSR-420 'Scientific' Rocket*WA2608201893*

[Editorial Report] In June, South Korea launched what press reports described as the country's first indigenous "scientific" rocket. A recent article in a ROK defense journal provides details of the rocket's engine and its design methodology, and names the companies and groups involved in the KSR-420 project's development.

The rocket is reported to be the first of a series that will undergo continuous modification.

Seoul KUKBANG KWA KISUL, a ROK defense industry journal, published in its August issue information on the development and characteristics of South Korea's indigenous "scientific research" rocket KSR-420. [For previous reporting on the KSR, see FBIS PERSPECTIVES 8.6, 31 May 93, and 8.7, 30 Jul 93.] The data appear in an article on the history of ROK rocketry written by Chae Yon-sok, senior researcher at the Korea Aeronautics and Space Research Institute (KASRI).

According to the article, basic research on the KSR began in 1987 within the Space Engineering Division of the ROK's Astronomy and Space Science Research Institute. Development continued the following year as a "special research project" of the Ministry of Science and Technology. When KASRI was founded in October 1989, the KSR program was transferred to that institute and full-scale development began. Dr. Yu Chang-su, chief of the Space Technology Research Department, has overall charge of the rocket program, while the Space Propulsion Engine Research Division has been given responsibility for developing engines, the article reports.

The following companies joined in developing the rocket engine:

- Korea Explosives (primary builder),
- Samsung Aerospace,
- Hankuk Fiberglass,
- Hankook Tire Mfg., and
- Daesung Precision.

Doowon Heavy Industries developed the fuselage and wings, and built the launch platform [previously reported as a vehicle-towed mobile launcher]. Seoul National and Yonsei Universities participated in some aspects of the basic research. The article notes that the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) "did not begrudge its support" for the project. ADD reportedly built the rocket's combustion tube, inspected the propulsion system, and allowed KASRI use of its ground-based experimental facilities.

The article provides technical details of the KSR-420's engine:

- length, 4 meters,
- diameter, 42 cm,
- weight, 580 kg.

Its combustion chamber is made of high-strength steel plate (AISI 4130) to withstand pressures of 1,000 psi or higher, and its interior walls are lined with an NBR-type of heat-resistant material against temperatures of 3,300 degrees Celsius. The solid propellant—aluminum

powder and ammonium chlorate (NH_4ClO_3)—burns 15 seconds to produce an average thrust of 21,000 pounds.

The forward (upper) and after parts of the combustion chamber are designed differently, which the article claims is typical. Some 75 percent of the propellant is stored in the forward section and burns for 15 seconds. This is reinforced by the remaining 25 percent of the charge kept in the after section, which burns simultaneously for 10 seconds. The propellant has a burn rate of 6-7 millimeters per second. The nozzle's entry and exit ports are made of a silicon-based composite material, and its neck is of graphite. No data was given on the ignition system other than that it is electrical.

The article states KASRI took the following requirements into account to develop the engine quickly and economically:

- (1) use as many indigenous materials as possible,
- (2) limit the technology to what is already available in South Korea,
- (3) reduce the number of tests by using computer simulation,
- (4) make maximum use of manufacturing and testing facilities owned by domestic companies and research institutes, and
- (5) build a "multi-purpose rocket motor" that can be used for repeated tests, also called a "heavy motor," (photo 1 below).

This multi-purpose test engine, designated "type-C," differs from the "flying" engine used in the 4 June launch, the article states. Designed for reuse in testing, its body can be lengthened as needed by linking up additional sections 42 cm in diameter by 60 cm long. The size and material of the nozzle can also be changed depending on the purpose of the test. The engine has been used three times, and "will continue to be used in the future for different kinds of performance tests." Using it enabled KASRI to develop the actual KSR-420 engine with just two stationary tests. The article notes that, in the course of developing the rocket engines, KASRI was able to learn much about "the software needed to design solid propellant rocket motors" that will be used in future rocket development.

Black and white photos were published with the article: the type-C heavy motor on a test gantry, undergoing a combustion test (photo 1 below), and the KSR-420 motor on a gantry, being tested (photo 2 below). Hangul letters to the right of KASRI's logo in photo 1 read "Korea Explosives, Inc." The photo of the fully-assembled KSR-420 atop a "mobile vehicle-towed launcher" (photo 3 below) appeared in a short article in the July issue of KUKBANG KWA KISUL announcing the rocket's successful launch.




Photo 1. Type-C Heavy Motor on Test Gantry




Photo 2. KSR-420 Motor on Gantry Being Tested




Photo 3. Fully-Assembled KSR-420 on Mobile Vehicle-Towed Launcher

U.S. To Talk With DPRK If Inter-Korean Talks Agreed

SK3008082493 Seoul YONHAP in English
0725 GMT 30 Aug 93

[Text] Washington, Aug. 29 (YONHAP)—Washington will agree to a third round of nuclear talks with Pyongyang if it sees progress in negotiations between the communist country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled to start Tuesday, and only if inter-Korean dialogue to comply with the declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula begins as promised, informed diplomatic sources said Sunday.

Washington and Pyongyang haven't begun to discuss a date for the third talks, the sources said, and the U.S.

side is firm that they will occur only if North Korea engages in dialogue with the IAEA and South Korea as agreed in the Geneva talks in July, they said.

North Korea is understood to have shown willingness to talk widely about the nuclear question with the international nuclear watchdog, the sources said.

They predicted that the talks, which may well include negotiations on extensive improvement of Pyongyang-Washington relations, will take place in mid-September if North Korea accepts inter-Korean dialogue.

It was premature to speak of the possibility of the talks or a date for them when the two conditions have yet to be met, they said.

IAEA Delegation Arrives in Pyongyang 31 Aug

*SK3108093893 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0900 GMT 31 Aug 93*

[Report by correspondent Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] Five International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiation delegates headed by Deputy Director General Brund Pellaud, arrived in Pyongyang this afternoon and started a five-day visit for the resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue.

This is the second time a high-level IAEA official visits Pyongyang in connection with the nuclear issue after Director General Hans Blix visited in May.

The IAEA negotiation delegation, which arrived in Pyongyang today, will start a five-day full-fledged nuclear negotiations tomorrow. It has been said that the main topic during the talks will be the IAEA partiality claimed by North Korea and the significant differences between the North Korea's initial report and the result of the IAEA inspection.

THAILAND

Pressure To Recall Workers in Libyan Chemical Plants

*BK0209033393 Bangkok THE NATION
in English 2 Sep 93 p A 1*

[Excerpt] Bangkok is caught in a bind over repeated calls by the United States to recall about 200 Thais working in

alleged chemical weapons plants in Libya as fear continues to grow that Washington might attack the sites, sources said yesterday.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, said Thailand has to take into consideration Libya's longstanding threat to expel all 25,000 Thais working in the country if the Thai authorities decide to repatriate the 200 workers at the chemical plants.

Thailand would be severely affected if all Thais had to leave Libya especially if there is no attack on the country, they said.

Meanwhile, the National Security Council has sent a "confidential" report to the Interior Ministry on the Thai workers in Libya entitled "Thai Workers Are Involved in Terrorism".

The report said about 200 Thais are working in the chemical weapons plants in Libya, which the United States considers as an act of terrorism or one in support of terrorists.

It said the United States has urged Thailand to recall its nationals who are allegedly working at the plant illegally.

To prevent this from reoccurring, the Interior Ministry will issue new labour regulations forbidding Thai workers to work in any arms factory. Deputy Interior Minister Suthat Ngoenmun said yesterday.

Suthat said the regulations would fix tough punishment, including both fines and imprisonment, for violators.

The new regulations will be proposed to the Interior Ministry soon and announced in the Royal Gazette later this month when they come into effect. [passage omitted]

CZECH REPUBLIC**Commission on Banning Chemical Weapons
Formed**

*LD0609204893 Prague CTK in English
2020 GMT 6 Sep 93*

[Text] Prague, Sept 6 (CTK)—A constituent session of the national preparatory commission for the ban on chemical weapons was held today, headed by the deputy minister of industry, Radomir Sabela.

The commission, comprised of representatives of the relevant central bodies, is to prepare implementation of the principles of the convention on prohibition, development, manufacturing, stockpiling and use of the chemical weapons and on their destruction into Czech legislation.

Sabela told CTK that although the Czech Republic did neither produce nor store chemical weapons, it would be a very difficult task. Organisations manufacturing the precursors which may serve as the first stage for the synthesis of chemical weapons, but which are also used for routine chemical production will be checked.

A state coordinating organisation which will cooperate with the Hague-based Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and which will be able to transfer the agreed data on industry and trade, to organise regular check and inspections and further activities stipulated by the convention will have to be established, too, said Sabela.

The convention will come into effect 180 days after the presentation of 65 ratification documents, but no sooner than two years after its presentation for signing. The earliest date possible is the beginning of 1995, which should be also a deadline for the Czech Republic, Sabela said.

Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec signed the international convention banning chemical weapons, which for the first time in history bars from military arsenals a whole category of the weapons of mass destruction, on 14 January.

The Czech Republic was among the more than 120 countries which signed the convention.

The convention stipulates that the signatory countries will destroy its chemical weapons within ten years. The convention will take effect six months after 65 states have ratified it, but not before January 1995.

ARGENTINA

Lawmaker Denies Weapons Technology Transfer to Iraq

PY0209215493 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1138 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 2 Sep (NA)—Conrado Storani Jr, deputy chairman of the defense committee of the Chamber of Deputies, has denied that the last Radical Civic Union administration transferred technology to Iraq, adding that countries like the United States, Germany, France, and Italy sold to that Asian nation "weapons worth \$56 million between 1976 and 1990."

In this regard Storani said that Germany sold to Iraq "chemical weapons" and France sold it "even a nuclear plant" that "Israel raided before it produced the necessary plutonium for producing a nuclear bomb."

Storani thus explained the existence, in Iraqi territory, of "plants that are identical" to the plant in Falda del Carmen, in Cordoba Province. He said that "the countries which transferred the technology to us also transferred technology to Iraq."

"We know there were three plants that were similar (to the Falda del Carmen plant), because there were similar technology transfers," Storani said yesterday in statements to a radio station.

On the other hand, the Cordoba lawmaker voiced concern about the fact that "plans are being made to make a dangerous industrial waste dump" at the Falda del Carmen facilities, adding that if this initiative is implemented "we will make a strong protest."

"We will not let our province become the waste dump of the First World. I wouldn't like this type of project anywhere in Argentine territory," the lawmaker maintained.

Storani recalled that when Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella reported to the Chamber of Deputies on 7 July, he "emphatically" denied that the Falda del Carmen plant would be recycled for use as "dangerous industrial waste dump."

He noted, however, that in an interview granted to a Cordoba newspaper, U.S. Ambassador James Cheek "neither denied it nor admitted it," for which reason "doubts have appeared" about the truthfulness of the reports.

After noting that he has already submitted a request for information on the subject at the Chamber of Deputies, he charged the Justicialist Party with "refusing to talk about or consider the subject" at the Chamber of Deputies.

Government Planning Construction of Small Nuclear Plants

PY0209234793 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1936 GMT 29 Aug 93

[Excerpts] Buenos Aires, 29 Aug (NA)—The government is planning to build small nuclear plants to counter a power deficit, ranging from between 3,000 to 7,000 megawatts, that has been projected for Argentina over the next 10 years, National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) chairman Manuel Mondino has said. [passage omitted]

"I can design a 350 megawatt plant at \$1,700 per installed kilowatt," Mondino said, adding that "this can be paid with CNEA funds, without having to resort to foreign capital."

In this regard Mondino said that no interest will have to be paid, and that there will not be the delays that are common in the implementation of big projects in underdeveloped countries.

The theory says that the bigger the plant, the lower the cost of the installed kilowatt. He said, however, that "if one takes into account the sociopolitical and economic disruptions that affect developing countries, which are highly unstable, it is necessary to take into account other factors."

Based on this, Mondino explained, the CNEA deems it more suitable to build small nuclear plants like Atucha-1 (350-450 megawatts), because the project could be completed within schedule.

In conclusion, despite the fact that he admitted that private capital should participate, Mondino said that the CNEA is an enterprise "that must be preserved at any cost."

INDIA

Foreign Secretary on Rao's PRC Visit, Missile Issue

BK0409033293 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0245 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Text] The summit talks between the prime minister and his Chinese counterpart, Mr. Li Peng, during Mr. Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing from Monday will focus on resolving the border issue. [passage omitted]

Replying to a question, the foreign secretary Dixit said New Delhi has already taken up the issue of Beijing's supply of missile parts and technology to Islamabad, expressing concern over the proliferation of such weapons. He said the matter relates to India's security and the country has to deal with it in a realistic manner.

U.S. To Pressure India To Subscribe to MTCR Guidelines

BK0309111993 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
in English 28 Aug 93 p 12

[by M. K. Dhar]

[Text] NEW DELHI, Aug. 27—The U.S. decision to impose sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani Ministries of Defence and their sub-agencies has caused no surprise to India which is aware of M-11 missile transfers to Islamabad.

However, in view of the almost identical demarches issued to India individually by the G-7 countries to stop development of Prithvi [earth] and Agni [fire] missiles, it is expected that U.S. pressure on India to give up these programmes and subscribe to the Missile Technology Control guidelines will mount further.

In response to a query on imposition of sanctions by the U.S., an External Affairs Ministry spokesman said: "We have been aware of transfer of missile parts and technology from China to Pakistan. We are also a fully aware of Pakistan's missile programme. With regard to the imposition of sanctions, we have no further comment as this matter pertains to these three countries."

However, according to diplomatic sources, the U.S. has imposed only Category II sanctions because the transfer involves certain items in the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Annex which contribute to missile development. The U.S. apparently is not sure that actual missile transfers have taken place. Category I includes those sensitive goods and technology whose exports should normally be denied—complete rocket systems,

unmanned air vehicle systems, specially designed production facilities and certain sub-systems, such as, missile stages and engines.

However, information available here suggests that actually finished M-11 Missile transfers have also taken place. Besides, Beijing has been supplying components and sub-systems to Pakistan for its Hatf-I and Hatf-II missiles.

Pakistan insists that these are short range ballistic missiles and cannot reach Delhi or any other major urban centres inside India. At the same time, it is developing the Hatf-III missile which will have a longer range.

Although China keeps denying that it has violated the MTCR guidelines by supplying M-11 missiles to Pakistan, it is known here that the missile is capable of carrying a nuclear payload of 500 kg to a distance of 300 kms. According to these reports deliveries of upto 30 M-11 missiles have already taken place and these are in the process of deployment.

India refuses to subscribe to the MTCR guidelines which it views as economic as well as military embargo used by industrialised countries to restrain the lower-cost competitors in the new generations of space nations. The guidelines are criticised as economic and military discrimination. Under the MTCR, in contrast with the Nuclear Nonproliferation regime, there is no positive incentives for the developing countries nor does it cast any obligation on the participating industrial nations to reduce their own arsenals.

At one stage all the components and technologies that could be used for missile production were not covered by the MTCR provisions, either because they were available elsewhere in the international market or because, they were not specifically constructed for the production of missile components. However, during the meeting of the MTCR members in Tokyo in March 1991, the U.S. updated and revised the list on controlled goods and technologies. Although the guidelines did not specifically say so, the U.S. appears to have taken upon itself to decide transfer of which types of missiles violates the guidelines even if their range and payload fall short of the prescribed 300 km - 500 kg limits.

China has maintained that presently several countries are experimenting with guided missiles that have a range of 100 to 200 kms. If these are experimentally successful, the production, use and distribution of these missiles should also fall within the purview of the MTCR.

China has been Pakistan's most reliable supplier of arms for decades and Chinese arms constitute 75 percent of Pakistan's tanks and 60 percent of its aircraft. According to intelligence sources, China is also alleged to have supplied technology, as well as, actual design of Pakistan's nuclear bomb besides helping extensively with its missile development programme.

ISRO Head Says Country Had Cryogenic Rocket Expertise

BK0209080893 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0730 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] The chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization, Professor U.R. Rao, has said that the country has the necessary expertise to develop cryogenic rocket technology on its own but opted for the Russian deal because Moscow offered it at cheaper rates. Speaking to newsmen at Sriharikota, Professor Rao said that the Russian engines were to be used in the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle [GSLV] slated for launching sometime in 1996. Professor Rao said indigenous development of the engine may cause a delay of two years in launching the GSLV.

IRAN

Iranian Nuclear Energy Chief on Iran's Program, Israel

NC2808195793 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Aug 93 p 4

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Engineer Reza Amrollahi by unidentified TEHRAN TIMES correspondent in Tehran—date not given]

[Text] Tehran—A high-ranking official at Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) highlighted the more salient uses of oil in the year 2000, terming its use as fuel for the plants "unreasonable."

Speaking exclusively to the TEHRAN TIMES, Head of the AEO Engineer Reza Amrollahi made mention of Iran's belief that the country's electricity output should not merely rely on fossil fuel, and said that up to the year 2005, Iran will derive up to 20 percent of its electric power from atomic energy.

Amrollahi cited Iran's purchase of two units of 300 megawatts apiece from China, noting that China has bought some parts of these plants from Western countries and will itself install them.

Iran has also signed documents with Russia on two 440 megawatt V.V.R. plants, [not further identified] he said adding that agreement has been reached so that the said plants' control part utilize systems manufactured in the West.

Amrollahi went on to add that these plants will be set up on the basis of the existing international rules and regulations, marking that Iran would cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO). He termed Iran's relations with the IAEO "specialized, friendly, and very transparent."

"Erection of atomic plants commenced from the year 1960 but faced an upward trend since 1970," he maintained adding that the number of atomic reactors has

soared from 70 in 1970 to 97 in 1977 to 361 in 1985. In 1993, he said, the number of atomic plants stood at 424.

"The Third World's share, however, is only 1.4 percent or 470 megawatts," he said noting that countries holding more than 80 percent of the earth's land and 90 percent of its inhabitants reap benefit of only a slight amount of this energy.

This, he said, is due to a flagrant discrimination sparked by the industrial world. As possession of atomic energy enhances industrial growth, the Western countries try to prevent the technological advancements of the Third World fearing the latter's development.

He also elaborated on Israel's publicity against the Islamic Republic of Iran and noted that Israel is a Zionist entity and has nothing in common with other countries of the region. "Israel," he marked "does not approve of and abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other commitments."

Amrollahi referred to specialist views to the effect that Israel's environment is swiftly deteriorating since numerous atomic arsenals are concentrated in a compressed area there.

He also maintained that Israel does not allow IAEO inspection of atomic sites. Amrollahi said that Israel's publicity is aimed at keeping a secret of these by way of diverting attention from them. He noted that with the collaboration of the dependent news agencies, Israel bars the disclosure of these matters.

He also referred to the IAEO's confirmation that Iran's atomic activities are peaceful.

He said, "One of the dimensions of every country's sovereignty is to utilize domestic sources for its progress and advancement. Now the West prevents the Islamic Republic of Iran's use of this right, he marked.

On the U.S. opposition toward Iran's atomic energy capability, he said that Western countries admit that since the U.S. has lost the Iranian market, specifically in regard to the nuclear industry, it endeavors to formulate international regulations barring Iran's use of these industries and technology.

Amrollahi said that the U.S. wants to keep this market away from other countries and to keep it for itself. He noted that on the other hand the U.S. considers itself responsible for maintaining Israel's security and annually grants billions of dollars of gratis aid to Israel for this purpose.

He called on the Iranian experts on atomic energy abroad to return and take part in activities of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and to use their knowledge and expertise to serve the country.

Amrollahi said that more than 50 percent of those engaged in the nuclear industry worldwide are from the Third World. He said this is a bid to keep these countries weak and reiterated his invitation to the Iranian experts to return to serve the AEO.

Japanese Envoy on Iran's Use of Nuclear Technology

LD3008165693 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1430 GMT 30 Aug 93

[Excerpt] In a meeting with First Vice President Hasan Habibi today, Japan's ambassador in Tehran described Iran's role in establishing peace in the region and in the world as very important and called for the greatest possible expansion of friendly ties between Iran and Japan and an increase in the two countries' commercial exchange.

The Japanese ambassador also referred to the Islamic Republic of Iran's principled stance on various international issues and spoke of the Islamic Republic of Iran's efforts toward development, reconstruction, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology as successful, adding the following: Iran's stance makes us more confident that Iran will use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. [passage omitted]

PAKISTAN

Foreign Secretary Says U.S. Talks Constructive, Positive

BK0409092093 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Text] The U.S.-Pakistan talks on regional security and nuclear nonproliferation ended in Washington last night. The foreign secretary, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, before his departure from Washington, told APP that his talks with the Clinton Administration on regional issues and bilateral matters were constructive and positive. He said U.S.-Pakistan cooperation would be further enhanced following his visit. A new chapter of friendship based on shared objectives of promoting peace, stability, nonproliferation and human rights would be opened. He said the talks had helped both the sides to understand each other's position more precisely. Earlier, the foreign secretary held talks with the director of the policy planning bureau in the State Department, Mr. (Talbot). Mr. Shaharyar Khan informed him about Pakistan's policy, particularly on the situation in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Central Asia. He outlined Pakistan's initiatives to develop its relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia.

Regional security talks between the two countries covered the issue of Kashmir, particularly the Siachen Glacier, as well as measures to lessen tension between India and Pakistan and to promote mutual confidence. APP says Pakistan is understood to have proposed several ideas, particularly regarding the need to stop massive violation of human rights taking place in held Kashmir. The U.S.-Pakistan security dialogue will be resumed in Islamabad in the near future. The Pakistan delegation has invited their American counterpart for the talks.

Nuclear Program Said To Be Frozen at 1990 Level

BK0209094893 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Pakistan has urged the United States to help resolve the Kashmir dispute following the success of the current U.S. mediatory efforts in the Middle East. The foreign secretary, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, who held a meeting with the secretary of state, Mr. Warren Christopher, in Washington, underscored the vital role the United States could play in the resolution of the conflict. He said a settlement of this dispute would contribute to resolution of other problems in the South Asia region and (lessen) the danger of nuclear proliferation.

Earlier, the foreign secretary met President Clinton's National Security Adviser Mr. Anthony Lake and discussed with him various issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, the Pressler Amendment, and the Kashmir issue.

Later, talking to newsmen, the Pakistan foreign secretary termed Kashmir as the core issue between India and Pakistan, which required a sincere effort to solve it. He said the secretary of state has encouraged the idea of talks between India and Pakistan in an effort to solve the issue. The foreign secretary welcomed the Clinton Administration's decision to adopt an evenhanded policy toward India and Pakistan on nuclear and other issues. Responding to a question, he said Pakistan had frozen its nuclear program at the 1990 level, but had not rolled it back. Pakistan, he said, remained inclined to eventually curtailing the program provided India also did it.

U.S. Termed 'World Bully' for Sanctions Policy

BK3008121793 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER in English 27 Aug 93 p 6

[Excerpts] The front page splash in almost all national dailies yesterday was the news item that the U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on both Pakistan and China because according to them the two countries have dealt in sensitive missile technology in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The action was not entirely unexpected but its timing caught us by surprise. For quite some time American officials have expressed their concern at the sale of M-11 missiles, capable of carrying 500 kg over a distance of 300 km. The arbitrary decision, taken in a typically high-handed fashion, is based on dubious legal, moral and practical grounds.

No sooner had the U.S. started its criticism of the deal that both Pakistan and China denied that any violation of the control regime had taken place since these were short-range tactical weapons meant only for defence purposes.

Reason requires the parties to seek international arbitration whenever there are differences in the interpretation of an accord. But the U.S. has imperiously chosen to act

as police, judge and jailer. By the way who has given the U.S. authority to dictate the terms of trade between two sovereign states? The proper forum of such disputed matter is the UN and its monitoring organs. Washington has assumed the role of world bully, trying to dictate independent countries how to conduct their trade.

American behaviour in this field is iniquitous, to put it mildly. Only recently it stopped a Chinese vessel carrying certain chemicals to Iran in violation of the laws of international trade. While the US appears so anxious to discourage other countries selling arms, it has been steadily enlarging its own share in the the arms trade of the world. Not only U.S. lacks authority and consistent policy in this regard, it has also selected a few unfortunate countries for its vindictive actions—Pakistan and China are the favourite targets. [passage omitted]

In the last analysis, the net loser is going to be the US itself. There is no shortage of countries and firms, who are willing to sell these systems if you are willing to pay the price. In addition to that physical restrictions cannot stop the operations of economic laws. [passage omitted]

U.S. Seen 'Losing Battle' on Proliferation Policy

BK3108122193 Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
27 Aug 93 p 6

[Editorial: "The Super-Power's Super Folly"]

[Excerpt] The United States has done it again. It has now imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan on a charge of violating the missile technology control regime. It is category two sanctions, which seeks to deny to both the countries U.S. items that directly or indirectly help in the missile development. Washington has informed its allies too of the sanctions and expects them to do likewise with similar suppliers to either country.

Of course, the M-11 Missiles allegedly supplied by China to Pakistan does not violate the MTCR as it applies to only missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometres. But the State Department spokesman says the issue is one of capability which implies the M-11 Missiles can be used for longer range as well. Of course, following the objections of the U.S. China and Pakistan very rightly insisted that the M-11 Missiles did not breach the MTCR, but the U.S. as the lone superpower has no time for such objections or explanations. The U.S. could have waited until August 30 when the full range of Pakistan-U.S. relations, including all the disputes, are to be discussed between Pakistan's foreign secretary Sharyar Khan and senior State Department officials in Washington. Evidently the superpower would go its own way majestically and let the lesser states explain later and seek redress.

The U.S. is now doing by itself what it had done in the 1970s and 1980s to stop France supply the agreed nuclear reprocessing plant for which Pakistan had made advance payment. The U.S. did all it could to ensure that other countries did not help Pakistan in building the

plant or acquiring nuclear capacity in any manner. The embargo became so extensive that even import of sophisticated textile mill parts was stopped and Pakistan was made to lose heavily on the industrial front as well. And now as a lone superpower the U.S. feels free to dictate to Pakistan even when it has not breached the MTCR and it is India which has been doing that merrily with its Agni and Prithvi missiles. But India is now its ally.

The U.S. does not want China to emerge as a strong power following the break up of the Soviet Union and become a significant arms supplier to third world states. Hence it had taken strong objection to Chinese arms supplies to Iran and Syria as well, but then as Chinese arms are less expensive even Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammad of Malaysia is buying them. So the U.S. is fighting a losing battle. Nevertheless fight it must as old habits die hard and now that it is the lone superpower it finds that it can be even more arbitrary than it has been and impose its will around the world.

When it comes to applying sanctions against small countries the U.S. can be very rough. While it changes its policies it can even refuse to deliver the goods other countries had paid for a long time ago. In this category comes the refusal aircraft for which Pakistan had paid a long time ago \$528 million with \$870 million more due for payment. The U.S. has not only withheld supply of the F-16s as the U.S. military aid has been suspended but also is charging a good deal of money for storing the planes. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Program Will Not Be Abandoned Despite U.S. Policy

BK3008120393 Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
30 Aug 93 p 1,9

[Editorial: "Moeen Qureshi on Nuclear Option"]

[Text] Addressing a news conference at Quetta airport Saturday afternoon caretaker Prime Minister Mr Moeen Qureshi declared that under no circumstances will Pakistan abandon its nuclear programme as it was vital for the country. However, he said, Pakistan was ready to discuss with the United States the nuclear and other issues which are of importance to the region and have bedevilled Islamabad's relations with Washington.

The caretaker prime minister's categorical assertion on the question of nuclear option has come at a time when new tensions have surfaced in the Pak-US relations because of the American decision to clamp sanctions on Beijing and Islamabad over the missile row and Foreign Secretary Mr Shahryar M Khan has arrived in Washington for wide ranging discussions with administration officials on the ties between the two countries. China has retaliated to the sanctions by threatening to withdraw support from the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—a key global arms control agreement—and Pakistan has lodged protest with the US describing Washington's decision as "unjust and misinformed." Any illusions which Washington might have entertained thus far to force Pakistan

to unilaterally give up its peaceful nuclear programme must have been belied by the Prime Minister's latest assertion more so as it has been made in response to renewed pressure from Washington on the nuclear issue.

It is good that Mr. Moeen Qureshi found an occasion to reiterate the country's nuclear policy and set aside doubts and misgivings in the minds of some that the caretakers were out to fulfil an American/World Bank agenda. Some people think that the manner in which the caretakers have unfolded their economic package and are chasing the NARCO dealers they are actually addressing US concerns. They have expressed fears that the nuclear issue being on the top of American agenda in post cold war era the caretakers will succumb to US pressures on it. [sentence as published] Some have feared that Pakistan did not possess the capacity to resist the will of the United States and that sooner or later it will have to take the American line. The Prime Minister's categoric no to abandoning nuclear programme should therefore serve to dispel any lingering doubts about the caretakers alleged weak-kneed response to Washington's nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.

Pakistan has been the victim of the U.S. ire for the last about three years when President Bush refused to give annual certification regarding the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme and invoking the notorious Pressler Law suspended all economic and military assistance to this country. Islamabad has been denied F-16s for which over \$600 million have already been paid and is being threatened with losing all the money it has paid so far. Pakistan came very close to being declared a terrorist state and was let off the hook recently only temporarily. And now sanctions have been imposed for a two-year period against both Beijing and Islamabad. If in spite of these pressures successive governments in Islamabad—even including the weak and unrepresentative ones like the caretakers—have vowed to uphold the country's nuclear programme Washington must spare a moment and ask itself 'why'?

Washington must understand that no matter what the pressure and what the inducements, no government in Islamabad can unilaterally give up its nuclear programme because it is a national programme enjoying bipartisan support. No pressures on Pakistan can succeed because all pressure tactics—the Pressler Law et al—are regarded in this country as highly discriminatory, unjust and arbitrary. No pressures and no inducements can work until there is some evenhandedness in Washington's approach towards non-proliferation by bringing India under the same regime. And no pressures will succeed as long as Pakistan feels that its own security and survival is threatened.

The problem with Washington is that it thinks that proliferation can be contained by denying technologies to developing countries and applying sanctions. This is a flawed perception of the issue. A country determined to make nuclear weapons because of security compulsions and political incentives will ultimately be able to

do so no matter how stringent technological embargoes and sanctions against it. When Moeen Qureshi said that under no circumstances Pakistan will abandon its nuclear programme he was only restating this obvious fact.

Editorial Urges U.S. Pressure Against India

BK3008111993 Islamabad THE NATION in English
30 Aug 93 p 6

[Editorial: "After the Sanctions"]

[Text] When the suspicion that the U.S.'s sanctions against Pakistan were prompted as much by its displeasure on Pakistan's nuclear programme as by the alleged import of M-11 missiles was voiced by a newsmen in the Prime Minister's [PM's] Press conference in Quetta, the PM's response was both forthright and clear. Calling the sanctions unjustified and based on wrong information, he not only asked for their withdrawal but also said that the question of Pakistan abandoning its nuclear programme did not arise. Whether this will persuade the US to reconsider its policy towards Pakistan is, however, another matter. The PM's wish to try to convince the U.S. of the bona fides of Pakistan's policies, howsoever desirable it may be, looks like an uphill task in view of the mindset in the U.S. State Department. There are three clear indications of that. First, that even after it found no evidence of Pakistan's involvement in any terrorist activity, the State Department still wishes to keep it on its watch-list. On the other hand, having solid proof of Indian terrorism in what it acknowledges as the "disputed" territory of Kashmir, and having itself listed in its report the Congress India's crimes against Kashmiris, India is not on the US watch-list. Second, that even though the U.S. acknowledges that Pakistan's limited nuclear programme is in response to India's far greater capability, and even though it approves of all the proposals made by Pakistan to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone (which India has repeatedly rejected), the U.S. insists on applying the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan. Third, that even though both China and Pakistan have said that transfer of this missile's technology is not violative of the Missile Control Regime, as against India's far more advanced and already tested missile programme, sanctions have been slapped on them. These sanctions may, on the one hand, hurt the U.S. commerce more and on the other encourage China to export even bigger missiles. Someone dealing with this region in the State Department is really not serving, for whatever reason, the U.S.'s own long-term interests—the grave harm that the U.S.'s one-sided sanctions may otherwise be causing to regional peace notwithstanding.

The PM has again asked the U.S. to use pressure against India to solve the Kashmir dispute, which is at the root of all the problems. Pakistan's and India's nuclear programmes, missile programmes, arms race, their wars, are all because of Kashmir. There is really nothing else. But India refuses to listen. If the U.S. is really interested in

getting the NPT, the MTCR and all its other laudable ideas observed, bringing Pakistan to heel and letting India flaunt its might, will not do it. The U.S. State Department does not have to look far to find out the real cancer of South Asian peace and does not have to go far to discover who does not want it cured

Foreign Minister on U.S. Sanctions, Indian Relations

BK0109054093 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 1 Sep 93

[Text] Pakistan would welcome a principled and even-handed U.S. policy toward South Asia. This was stated by Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar while talking to reporters in Islamabad yesterday. He said the recent dialogue between the two countries is a good beginning and that an in-depth discussion should take place in Washington so that the United States can understand Pakistan's point of view.

Referring to the recent U.S. sanctions against Pakistan and China over the supply of missiles, he said Pakistan acquired some missiles from China because of its security requirements, but that this acquisition did not in any way violate the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]. The foreign minister said that Pakistan has not started a regional arms race by acquiring these missiles. He said that it was necessary for Pakistan to acquire some missiles from China—within the limits of the MTCR—because of the threat of Scud missiles and the Indian missile manufacturing programs, which receive foreign help. He termed the sanctions against Pakistan and China over the question of missiles unfair and unwarranted.

On relations between Pakistan and India, the foreign minister said Pakistan wants to normalize its ties with India, but Indian atrocities in occupied Kashmir and its refusal to give the right of self-determination to Kashmiris have created tension. He said Pakistan wanted to solve the Kashmir issue in accordance with UN resolutions and keeping the wishes of Kashmiris in view.

Television Reports Opening of Talks With U.S.

BK0309145793 Islamabad PTV Television Network in English 1400 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] In Washington, Pakistan and the U.S. have begun talks on regional security and nuclear nonproliferation in an effort to resolve the underlying problems that cause tensions and instability in South Asia. The meeting was opened by Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan who explained Islamabad's position on such vital issues as Kashmir, the Pressler Amendment under which the United States has cut off economic and military assistance to Pakistan, and the Indo-Pakistan relations. The United States side was headed by Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs (Robin Raphael). The State Department officials said the talks covered a wide-ranging agenda, including regional security perspectives, the global nuclear nonproliferation policy of the Clinton Administration, the proposal for a five-nation conference aimed at establishing a nonproliferation regime, the South Asia ballistic missile initiative, and the control of weapons of mass destruction.

The Pakistan side presented a detailed information on the security situation facing Pakistan in the post-Cold War era. The Kashmir issue was also discussed at considerable length and approaches to resolve the issue were examined.

Pakistan explained its approach to nonproliferation which was focused on the threat emanating from India's capacity to build nuclear weapons. Pakistan reiterated its willingness to endorse any meaningful measures for nonproliferation on the basis of equity and nondiscrimination vis-a-vis India. Pakistan also conveyed its thinking on the issue of preventing a ballistic missile race in South Asia. The suggestion came in the wake of unconfirmed reports of Indian plans to deploy its short-range missiles against Pakistan. The two sides also dwelt at length on several specific ways to promote the goals of nuclear nonproliferation on regional and global basis. The modalities to convene a conference on regional nonproliferation and security, taking into account the five-nation conference proposal, was also discussed.

RUSSIA

'Text' of Russian-Ukrainian Communiqué Released*LD0409072393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0712 GMT 4 Sep 93*

[Text] Moscow September 4 TASS—The press service of the Russian president circulated on Saturday the text of the joint communiqué signed by Presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine in the Crimea on Friday.

"During the working meeting between President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Leonid M. Kravchuk of Ukraine in the Crimea on 3 September 1993 an exchange of opinions on a wide range of issues of mutual interest took place. Among the issues discussed were further development of bilateral relations and, in particular, economic cooperation between the two countries, mutual payments, the Black Sea Fleet and strategic nuclear weapons.

The presidents stressed that Russian-Ukrainian relations are relations of special partnership for both states.

The presidents have instructed the state delegations to prepare within a month proposals for solving the problem of the Black Sea Fleet on a comprehensive basis, taking into account the ideas and agreements reached during the talks.

Also discussed was the question about the settlement of Ukraine's debt to Russia for 1992-1993.

The presidents confirmed their intention to continue efforts aimed at reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons which may become an important factor for building peace free of nuclear self-destruction. In this connection a set of questions was discussed, including on the utilisation of nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine and fair compensation for them.

Participating in the summit meeting heads of government Viktor S. Chernomyrdin and Leonid M. Kuchma signed:

- an agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of Ukraine on utilisation of nuclear warheads;
- basic principles of utilisation of nuclear warheads of strategic missile forces stationed in Ukraine;
- an agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the mechanism for exercising supervisory control over the exploitation of strategic nuclear complexes of strategic forces stationed on their territory.

The presidents expressed mutual will to promote further development and expansion of bilateral ties between Russia and Ukraine, especially in the economic sphere, on the basis of principles of equality, mutual benefit and

honest fulfillment of obligations, and with due account of mutual interests and international law.

Boris N. Yeltsin and Leonid M. Kravchuk emphasised the usefulness of the summit meeting and expressed readiness to continue this practice.

The meeting was held in the atmosphere of mutual understanding and constructive dialogue.

President of Russia President of Ukraine

Boris N. Yeltsin Leonid M. Kravchuk."

Glavkosmos Said To Pursue India Cryogenic Engines Deal*PM1708083993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Aug 93 First Edition p 4*

[Sergey Leskov report: "Russian Space Industry Does Not Yet Know Whom To Emulate"]

[Text] The ins and outs of the contract to deliver boosters for cryogenic engines to India continue to be actively discussed at various Russian departments. The situation is extremely confused: Despite the results of the Washington talks by the new "team" headed by Yuriy Koptev, general director of the Russian Space Agency, the Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research [Glavkosmos] is continuing to meet its commitments under the Indian contract without any letup.

The situation is compounded by the fact that the funds earned from our few international contracts are the only and last chance for survival for the Russian space industry. In 1988-1993 the number of specialists employed on the space program fell by 30 percent. And the number of scientists working for the space sector fell by 35 percent. Average earnings in the sector are...19,600 rubles a month. Despite the fact that the space sector requires long-term investment, it is only receiving 30 percent of its budget appropriations, and even that is being paid on a month-by-month basis.

IZVESTIYA was told by Glavkosmos Deputy Director Oleg Firsyuk that his organization has not received any official documents compelling it to stop meeting the contract. Specialists from the "Khimash" Design Bureau named for Isayev and the "Saturn" Science and Production Association—where the oxygen-hydrogen liquid-propellant rocket engines were developed—are still traveling to India, and Indian engineers are diligently studying Russian technology in our country.

According to Glavkosmos calculations, if the contract were to be torn up, Russia would lose \$300 million, and no less than 100,000 Russian specialists, who are working on the Indian order, would be left jobless. Glavkosmos is also scathing about the Koptev team's pledge to give the Americans full information on missile

technology contracts as of 1990, which could considerably complicate relations with enterprises in the CIS aerospace complex.

It is curious that even Yuriy Koptev himself does not deny the Glavkosmos argument that oxygen-hydrogen liquid-propellant rocket engines cannot be used on missiles. But, ultimately, there is a danger—even if India is entirely sincere and is not currently contemplating this—that these engines could be transformed and improved for military purposes. This is just what happened to the Soviet missiles called "Scud" in the West. Certain egg-heads were able to increase their 300-km range—which is in line with the missile technology nonproliferation regime—to 1,000 km.

Yet another counterargument is advanced by the Russian Government expert Vladimir Pivnyuk. According to his information, the figures presented by Glavkosmos to substantiate the exceptional advantages of the Indian contract do not correspond to reality. The actual amount of the contract is just \$140 million. And equipment worth \$33 million has currently been shipped. Glavkosmos Director Aleksandr Dunayev protests that, at any event, the Americans' vague promises to ultimately allow Russia access to the market for space services cannot stand comparison with real, "hard" money.

Of course, our gains from possible cooperation with the United States and West Europe cannot be compared to contracts with the developing countries. Yuriy Koptev makes the following assessments of the West's possible space orders from Russia: launch of communications satellites, \$600-700 million; phase one of cooperation on the "Mir" space station, \$400 million; participation in building the "Freedom" space station, \$800-1,100 million. But, when asked how realistic Russia's chances of winning international tenders are, Yuriy Koptev frankly replied: "I cannot say. But it is better to try to get into the market than to nip the idea in the bud."

For any serious businessman, entering a market goes hand in hand with the need to carefully study market conditions. Unfortunately, lulled by the real might of our rocket technology, we had until recently explained our commercial failures in this unique market by reference to the COCOM [Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions and the hostile actions of perfidious Western businessmen.

But the reality which is preventing Russia from filling the whole world with its missiles and satellites is as follows. There were just 19 launches on the open market in 1992. The sphere of these services is not only not expanding but is tending to decline. Only 104 satellites will have entered the open market by the year 2000. Launch arrangements have already been made for 60 of them. The record-holder in this area is the European Ariane rocket, which has 40 orders. The Russian "camp" has just one commercial launch—for the Inmarsat satellite. But even this success was not the result of winning a tender; it was the consequence of a political decision by the U.S. and Russian

Presidents. In this situation we are hoping that several low-earth-orbit Iridium spacecraft will enter our portfolio like manna from heaven. Russian hopes are basically pinned on the powerful Proton rocket, which has been tested many times in practice—unlike the French Ariane-5, which is still under construction.

Thus, in the space services market which we are eyeing so longingly, virtually all the slots have been filled for many years to come. Yes, it is very hard to answer the age-old question of which is better—a bird in the hand or two in the bush. It is basically a question of the Russian space industry choosing its development strategy and its priorities in world cooperation.

In this situation it would be exceptionally important for the space industry if we were to focus the efforts of all our structures working at commercial level. But it has to be stated that the Russian Space Agency and Glavkosmos, which have emerged from the bowels of the powerful and now-defunct Ministry of General Machine Building, are wasting a considerable proportion of their energies on recriminations. Yet, in private conversations, representatives of both departments sadly state that at a certain point the conflict over the cryogenic engines could have been resolved peacefully and calmly—even the Americans had already compromised. But there followed the angry and fabricated accusations from the parliamentary rostrum—where the former cosmonaut Vitaliy Sevastyanov was particularly active—and the departments clashed head on, to the delight of politicians who had made political capital out of it.

The material damage to Russia from this domestic confrontation is yet to be determined. The Indian cryogenic engine contract is currently being viewed not from the economic standpoint—as it should be—but as just another argument in the battle between parliament and government.

Atomic Minister on Nuclear Issues, Ukraine

MK1808110193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Aug 93 pp 1.3

[Interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian atomic energy minister, by Andrey Vaganov, under "Armaments" rubric: "It Will Take Ukraine Several Decades to Become a Nuclear Power. The Russian Nuclear Arms Complex, According to Russian Federation Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov, Is Not In Any Way Inferior to That of the United States' and Is Evaluated at \$5 Billion"; place and date not given—first six paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov was born in 1934. In 1957, when he was still a student at the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute, on the recommendation of Academicians Ya.B. Zelgovich and A.D. Sakharov, he was sent on special assignment to the secret city of Arzamas 16 to write his graduation thesis on the subject of compression of super-small masses of active nuclear

materials. Prior to that, he passed the famous "theoretical minimum" to Lev Landau. Slightly more than 40 people have succeeded at that during the entire period.

After graduating from the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute, he was assigned to work at Arzamas-16 on a regular basis. There, he moved up all the steps of the career ladder: from junior research associate, to head of a department, to professor.

In 1969, he was sent to Moscow to work at the Scientific and Research Institute of Impulse Technology to develop diagnostic systems and methods of registering rapid processes. As at Arzamas-16, he moved up from head of a department to director and scientific supervisor.

In November 1988, he was appointed deputy minister in charge of the nuclear arms complex of the USSR Atomic Energy and Industry Ministry.

Since March 1992, following a Russian presidential edict, he has been the Russian Federation's atomic energy minister.

He takes special pride in the fact that in 1988, he was in charge of a group of our specialists in a joint experiment aimed at improving the methods of monitoring the power of subterranean nuclear explosions in the United States and in the USSR.

Vaganov: Here is a question which it is difficult not to ask. Ukraine has officially announced that it is the owner of nuclear weapons. Already last year, reports appeared that Ukraine was trying to develop an independent system of codes, or, as they say, to acquire its own "nuclear black box." How feasible is this from a purely technical point of view?

Mikhaylov: I have just returned from Kiev, on Saturday, where I stayed for two days. We discussed an agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on dismantling strategic nuclear forces. Our delegation was headed by Ambassador-at-large Yuriy Dubinin. We agreed on and inked the basic principles of compensation for nuclear active materials; and we heard no statements to the effect that you have mentioned. Apparently our mass media have been giving overly liberal interpretations to particular statements. Quite to the contrary, we came to a mutual understanding on questions of dismantling nuclear strategic forces in Ukraine and on compensation for this dismantling; and I was even surprised that such an agreement has not been completed before now. Some people must be benefiting from preserving tensions in relations between our states.

Vaganov: Nonetheless, references are being made to Ukrainian scientists....

Mikhaylov: I can express my own opinion. In order for Ukraine to become a nuclear power, many, many decades would be needed; and also funds, which it lacks. I think, rather to the contrary, at present Ukraine needs both the Nonproliferation Treaty and the International

Atomic Energy Agency's guarantees; and this desire does exist in Ukraine. Of course, it is Ukraine itself that will decide on the timeframe for this process.

Anything could be developed in principle. But what would it cost? The whole of Russia has worked to create our present nuclear complex. It is estimated today at around \$5 billion. I am not even saying that a corresponding scientific basis is needed, production facilities, qualified specialists, and an infrastructure. Many countries have \$5 billion "to spare." But in order to create requisite teams, decades would be needed. (According to expert estimates, the value of the basic assets of the U.S. Energy Ministry's nuclear arms complex is estimated at over \$15 billion).

Therefore, in my opinion, this question has been virtually settled with Ukraine, and in the near future a corresponding agreement will be signed.

Vaganov: What is Russia's current nuclear arms complex like? What is its place in the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's overall volume of work?

Mikhaylov: At present, there are approximately 1 million employees working under the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry: at enterprises, in research institutes, design organizations, and production complexes. In the ministry itself, there are some 900 officers. (Incidentally, when the ministry was formed in 1953—at that time it was called the Ministry of Medium Machine Building—the number of its employees was 3,031). Projects related to the nuclear arms complex constitute 15 percent, while the remaining 85 percent are civilian projects.

Russia's nuclear arms complex is, without exaggeration, a unique one. It incorporates 10 closed cities with an overall number of some 700,000 people. Among them are two federal centers that have a worldwide reputation—the All-Russia Scientific and Research Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16) and the All-Russia Scientific and Research Institute of Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk-70).

Vaganov: What does it cost the taxpayer to pay for the upkeep of the nuclear arms complex?

Mikhaylov: Owing to inflation, it is very difficult to keep track of the prices. But even in the better days, in comparable prices, we spent three to four times less than the United States was spending on its national laboratories and the corresponding nuclear complex. Moreover, in terms of the volume, everything that we created within that complex exceeds by 1.5 to 2 times everything created by other nuclear powers.

In 1990 prices, each taxpayer is paying approximately 10 rubles for the upkeep of the nuclear arms complex.

Vaganov: I know that you have recently returned from Arzamas-16. What was the aim of your trip there?

Mikhaylov: First of all, I am the scientific supervisor of that center. Yuliy Borisovich Khariton, who directed the

Federal Center for over 40 years, has now retired. In February 1994, he will be 90. He has remained our honorary scientific adviser. Therefore, I visit that center more often than other installations. But the latest trip was related not only to the development of a number of scientific programs, including conversion projects, but also to the very complicated financial and economic condition of the center. Although now we have paid salaries up to July, there was a delay of more than three months.

Vaganov: And what is the average salary?

Mikhaylov: At that center it is approximately 40,000 rubles. But as of 1 July, it was raised to 74,000. True, today, owing to a shortage of cash, we have not yet paid these new salaries.

Vaganov: A "brain-drain" from Arzamas-16: Would it be correct to say that this problem exists?

Mikhaylov: The question of the brain drain in nuclear physics needs qualification. In high energy physics, in superconductivity physics, and in thermonuclear synthesis—in these areas our specialists have always been actively working in, among others, the United States, on the Dallas supercollider (for details on the supercollider project, see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA no. 118, 26 June 1993—A.V.); in Geneva, and in other nuclear centers around the world; and this remains one of the principles of our ministry's work.

As for the brain drain in the nuclear arms complex, this does not exist at present. Our country is very strictly implementing the 1968 treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology. With respect to manpower turnover, in 1992 and in the eight months of this year, we lost some 30,000 scientific and research workers in all of our centers.

U.S. To Grant Russia \$85 Million for Nuclear Disarmament

LD0309205693 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1930 GMT 3 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Arkadiy Sidoruk]

[Text] Washington September 3 TASS—Russian Minister for Nuclear Power Engineering Viktor Mikhaylov and U.S. Deputy Defense Minister for Political Issues Frank Wisner signed an agreement on Thursday on U.S. granting Russia \$85 million in aid for carrying out nuclear disarmament and exercising control over nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes.

The funds will be provided within the framework of the Nunn-Lugar draft bill from allocations of the American military department totally worth \$800 million and intended for providing aid to newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in the elimination of thousands of nuclear warheads and the storage of nuclear materials.

The Pentagon's statement circulated in the American capital, says that these agreements are a considerable step forward in Russo-American cooperation aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union posing no danger to the environment and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

One of the signed documents envisages granting \$75 million for the purchase of equipment and training technical personnel of a facility expected to be established in Russia for the storage of nuclear fuel obtained from dismantled weapons.

Another agreement provides for the allocation of \$10 million in technical aid to Russia to modernize the system of control, estimation and storage of nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes.

Yeltsin Rules Out Nuclear Status for Ukraine

LD0309072893 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0719 GMT 3 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow September 3 TASS—A Russian-Ukrainian summit in the Crimea will focus on problems of bilateral relations, the Black Sea Fleet, and nuclear weapons, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told reporters on Friday before leaving Moscow for the Crimea to meet his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kravchuk.

Replying to a query of ITAR-TASS, Yeltsin said: "We can not allow Ukraine to be a nuclear power."

Touching upon a possible response of the Russian parliament to the results of the summit, the president said that "there can be such agreements with Leonid Kravchuk which will suit parliament."

Yeltsin Interviewed on Talks With Kravchuk

LD0409171293 Moscow *Russian Television Network*
in Russian 1622 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Interview with Russian President Boris Yeltsin by Russian TV correspondent Boris Belov and unidentified OTV correspondent in Moscow on 4 September—recorded]

[Excerpt] **Belov:** Boris Nikolayevich, an accord was reached on the Black Sea Fleet yesterday. None of the previous accords have been fulfilled, in one way or another. What are the guarantees that this latest accord will be fulfilled?

Yeltsin: The latest accord is linked with financial issues, with Ukraine's debt to Russia. Three matters were discussed: the debts, the Black Sea Fleet, and nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

There was, I would say, a breakthrough regarding nuclear arms. As far as Belarus and Kazakhstan are concerned, we have long-standing agreements with them. There are

no problems there. There have been problems with the Ukraine, and we have agreed on compensation in the form of unenriched uranium in the quantity that they transfer to us as nuclear warheads. Our specialists will dismantle these warheads, transport them, and recycle [utilizirovat] them appropriately at our factories.

The United States is helping us with this. Four hundred million dollars have been earmarked from the budget and approved by Congress to separate the plutonium and uranium and later give the unenriched uranium back to the Ukraine for its nuclear power stations.

All documents concerning this problem were signed yesterday. We consider the affair closed. For us, there is nothing left to clarify.

There is a timescale, and there is the matter of how to do it in technical terms—how to transport and destroy them and at what speed—absolutely everything. As regards compensation for tactical weapons, we have already destroyed them and we did not have such a compensation agreement in the past. [passage omitted]

'Priority Tasks' in Handling Radioactive Waste Approved

LD2908140593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0855 GMT 29 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Aug—The Russian Government has approved a list of priority tasks to implement the Russian Federation state program on handling radioactive waste and spent nuclear material and their use and burial.

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has been instructed to conclude within two months state contracts for 1993 for carrying out priority work on the handling of radioactive waste and spent nuclear material and their use and burial, bearing in mind the need to have a state ecological appraisal of preliminary planning, preliminary design, and design documents.

Government Sets Priorities for Handling Nuclear Waste

PM0709114793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 2 Sep 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under "Executive Branch: Monitoring" rubric: "Documents"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Russian Government has approved a list of priority jobs to implement the Russian Federation State Program for the handling of radioactive waste and spent nuclear materials and their recycling and burial.

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has been instructed to conclude within two months state contracts for 1993 for the fulfillment of priority jobs with regard to

handling radioactive waste and spent nuclear materials, recycling them, and burying them, with due regard for the need to conduct a state ecological expert appraisal of preliminary planning, preliminary design, and design materials.

Military Space Forces Launch Cosmos 2262

LD0709143593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1400 GMT 7 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS stringer Semen Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Sep—A "Soyuz" carrier rocket carrying the "Cosmos 2262" spacecraft was launched at 1725 Moscow time today from the Baykonur cosmodrome by the Military Space Forces of Russia.

The Military Space Forces press center told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the launch was successful. A satellite was placed in an orbit close to that prescribed. The launch was carried out in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The satellite is controlled by the main center for the control and testing of spacecraft (in the town of Golitsino-2), which is part of the structure of the Military Space Forces.

Export Control of Dual Purpose Goods To Be Tightened

MK1009112693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 10 Sep 93 p 2

[Vadim Bardin report under "Session of Export Control Commission" rubric: "Export Control Lists To Be Expanded"]

[Text] After a long break the Russian Commission on Export Control has held a session devoted to ensuring more effective oversight of Russia's observance of its international obligations on the nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and technology for their production. A decision was made to expand the lists of dual purpose goods relating to conventional weapons.

The Russian Export Control Commission was established by presidential edict on 11 April 1992. It was headed first by Yegor Gaydar, then Georgiy Khizha and now, as of 26 June 1993, First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets.

The government's Export Control Commission—Eksportkontrol—does not have anything to do with the Federal Currency and Export Control Service, except in name. Whereas the latter is concerned with finding and returning to the country hard currency that was taken out illicitly, Eksportkontrol is primarily an instrument to ensure Russia's implementation of its international obligations on nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons. Various international organizations have adopted control regimes. Russia has already become a

member of the "British Club," which includes 26 countries supplying nuclear technologies. Although so far it has not acceded to the "Australian Club" (chemical and biological weapons production technology) and the missile technology control system, Russia nonetheless observes their requirements.

In addition to internationally recognized ones, Russia, like many other countries, has its own lists of dual purpose goods and technologies whose export is subject to control. A parallel with Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] that suggests itself here is not quite correct, however. Russia, in contrast to the United States, has no restrictive lists, and provided that particular requirements are complied with, export is possible. Despite the differences in control and appraisal procedures, there are two basic requirements. First, the importer has to provide a state guarantee that the products received will not be used for military purposes. Second, reexport is possible only with the sanction of Russia's Eksportkontrol. The Economy Ministry's export control department processes the appropriate documents.

The measures to enhance the effectiveness of export control proposed at the session include a detailed coding of control list items. The main thing, however, is the basic decision on expanding the national lists relating to conventional armaments. Such a measure can have mixed implications. On the one hand, prevention of dual purpose goods is one of the conditions for liberalizing trade with the United States. On the other, centralization of the export of raw materials is accompanied by the tightening of state control over high technology exports, which actually means strengthening administrative controls over the exporter.

ARMENIA

Grachev on Nuclear Weapons on Ukrainian Territory

Recycling Weapons Stressed

LD0409151393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1320 GMT 4 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS military observer Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Sep—The leaders of Russia and Ukraine signed "a package of documents necessary for guaranteeing nuclear and ecological safety in the use of nuclear weapons situated on the territory of Ukraine" in the Crimea on Friday, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, stated at a news conference today. This package includes "the basic principles for recycling [boyezaryad] nuclear weapons of the strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine," an intergovernmental agreement "on recycling nuclear weapons" and an agreement "on the procedure for carrying out the guaranteed and signatories [avtorskiy] inspection on the use of strategic missile complexes."

In accordance with these documents, he said, "all warheads of strategic nuclear weapons are withdrawn to Russia's territory, and are recycled at Russian enterprises. The Ukraine receives either rods for reactors of nuclear power stations, or a proportion from the sale of low-enriched Uranium. Naturally, Russia's expenses will be taken into account for the dismantling, transportation, and processing of the warheads."

"Our accords on the recycling of these weapons will be a gesture of goodwill, designed to clear away the problem of ratification of the START I Treaty in the Ukrainian Supreme Council," Pavel Grachev said.

In his opinion, the signing of these documents, "will lead to a qualitatively positive change for the better in the development of the situation around nuclear weapons, and the whole set of international problems that have arisen in connection with this. They are in the interests of the Ukraine and Russia, and lead not only to the untying of one of the most serious knots of contradictions between our states, but also to strengthening of their positions in the world community," the head of the Russian War Department stressed.

Replying to the ITAR-TASS observer's question as to whether the Ukrainian Supreme Council's decision on "administrative control" of the nuclear forces stationed on its territory will remain in force, Pavel Grachev said: "The Ukraine confirms all the statements made earlier on this subject and is not renouncing a single one of them."

In his turn, Colonel-General Yevgenniy Maslin, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, said in reply to a question by the ITAR-TASS correspondent on the schedule for dismantling and transporting nuclear weapons to Russia: "The work will be carried out according to a schedule that the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine plan to draw up and approve soon." He stressed that at issue were weapons installed both on liquid-fuel and solid-fuel missiles. Weapons whose service life has expired will be dismantled first.

The Russian side considers that 17 months will be sufficient to remove the warheads from Ukrainian territory and completely reprocess them. The fear of remaining, after the warheads have been dismantled "one by one," with the problem of the carrier-rockets, which some of the Ukrainian military are expressing, is completely groundless, Col-Gen. Maslin considers. Once the warheads have been dismantled, it is possible to place equivalent ones on the missiles, and carry out inspection and servicing work for a considerable period. "The world is worried about the nuclear weapons that now exist in Ukraine, even on missiles that are not being properly maintained," he pointed out.

Developing this theme Pavel Grachev stressed that the Russian side was prepared to help Ukraine with the recycling of carrier-rockets and rocket fuel.

More on Grachev's Remarks

*LD0509160293 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1330 GMT 5 Sep 93*

[Passages in quotation marks recorded]

[Text] As we have already reported, three documents opening the way to a solution to the problem of nuclear and environmental safety in the use of the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine were signed at the meeting in the Crimea between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. This is what Army General Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, thinks of the accords:

Grachev: The present draft agreements resolve all the key questions between the two states in the nuclear field on the following principles: All warheads of strategic nuclear weapons will be withdrawn to Russian territory and recycled in Russian enterprises. As a result, Ukraine will receive either fuel elements—these are rods—for its atomic power stations or a proportion from the sale of low-enriched uranium on the world market.

Russia's expenses for the dismantling, transportation, and processing will be deducted from all this. Our accords on the recycling of these weapons will be a gesture of goodwill, designed to clear away the problem of ratification of the START-I treaty in the Ukrainian parliament.

Correspondent: Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of the 12th directorate [of the Russian Defense Ministry], made an important supplementary point:

Maslin: As for the weapons, two documents were signed. These are an agreement on the recycling of the nuclear weapons and on the basic principles under which this recycling process will be conducted. They apply to all nuclear munitions classed as strategic offensive weapons.

Within what time scale will the warheads be dismantled and removed to Russia? The basic principles signed in relation to the recycling say that the dismantling and removal work will be carried out under a schedule to be drawn up in the immediate future and approved by the prime ministers of the two governments. I would like to reiterate that the principles apply to all weapons, including those on both liquid- and solid-propellant missiles. However, the first to be dismantled will be those nuclear weapons which have reached the end of their service life or whose warheads or individual components thereof have passed the end of the period during which they may safely be stored.

Correspondent: One more detail was revealed by Army General Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister:

Grachev: The essence of the Russian side's initiative on the removal and recycling of the nuclear warheads was that we proposed to Ukraine that we will guarantee to remove and recycle the nuclear warheads within 18

months. They reached understanding. Our president then proposed 20 months and subsequently 24 months, and finally they agreed on what General Maslin has just told you. The groups will get together quickly and work out a schedule for the removal and recycling.

BELARUS

Shushkevich on Speeding Up Nuke Withdrawal

*LD0109192393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1755 GMT 1 Sep 93*

[by BELINFORM correspondent Vladimir Glod]

[Text] Minsk, September 1 TASS—"Only Russia has a moral right to possess nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, despite their considerable scientific and technical potential, could not have created them by their own effort," Belarusian Parliament Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich said in an interview with the U.S. NBC Television Network on August 31.

According to Shushkevich, retaining nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus is figuratively speaking, sitting on a gunpowder box and using bad matches to light a cigarette. The presence of weapons of mass destruction in Belarus poses a threat to its national security, he said. In the event of military conflicts between great powers the attacking side will always seek to suppress the adversary's points of launching nuclear weapons. During the years of the cold war enough of them have been located on the territory of Belarus making it a target for total defeat.

"It is madness to have a nuclear powder cell on the main way from Russia to Western countries," Shushkevich said. "Belarus intends to speed up the withdrawal of strategic weapons from its territory so that a nuclear-free belt in Europe extend from French borders to the borders of the Russian Federation," Shushkevich declared.

U.S. Equipment To Help Control Nuclear Components

*LD3008211793 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 1000 GMT 30 Aug 93*

[Text] At the current stage, the United States is particularly attentive toward the organization of export controls in the CIS republics containing former USSR strategic nuclear weapons. As our defense minister told a ZVYAZDA correspondent during the above-mentioned visit to the United States [of Belarusian delegation headed by Stanislav Shushkevich], in particular special equipment will be installed at Belarusian customs posts, border posts, and crossing points that will prevent both import to and export from Belarus, or transit through its territory, of any nuclear components.

In reality, last year's U.S.-Belarusian agreement concerning a line of permanent communication has almost

been implemented. In accordance with that agreement the United States has allocated \$2.3 million. The mentioned equipment from the United States has already been installed in the National Center for Control and Inspection. The official launch of that line is planned for the last day of the this summer, 31 August 1993.

ESTONIA

Preliminary Work for Removal of Soviet Reactor Complete

WS0309114893 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE
in English 1945 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Tallinn, September 2—Estonia has completed preliminary work to enable the Russian navy to remove their training reactor from the ex-Soviet submarine training base in west Estonia, Paldiski.

"The railway branch line which was built to take reactor equipment out of Paldiski, is ready," Ants Viin, the deputy director of Estonia's state-owned railway company, Eesti Raudtee, told ETA.

The railway will officially be opened on Tuesday after an inspection by a state-appointed commission.

"The railway has done everything to enable safe removal of nuclear equipment located at Paldiski," Viin said.

Estonia has now fulfilled another condition Russia has set for Estonia before removing its nuclear equipment, Enn Tupp, the head of the defence policy department of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, said.

The Russian navy, however, has previously said they were considering removing the equipment by sea.

KAZAKHSTAN

Nazarbayev Calls for Testing Moratorium Until 2005

LD3008113993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1129 GMT 30 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Feodor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty August 30 TASS—President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan appealed to the governments of all nuclear powers to extend until the year 2005 the moratorium on testing nuclear, chemical, biological and other kinds of mass annihilation weapons.

He was speaking to participants in an international anti-nuclear forum in Almaty.

Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan used to be a nuclear testing site for all republics of the former Soviet Union but now it is left alone to deal single-handedly with the problem of social insurance to people who had suffered from the tests. Historically, morally and ecologically it is not fair,

Nazarbayev said. Continuance of obligations assumed before the people cannot be lifted, particularly from politicians.

Kazakhstan needs technological, engineering and ecological assistance from the countries which have amassed experience in the field. Another pressing problem is what to do with plutonium from dismantled warheads. The problem must be solved in conformity with international agreements.

"We believe that Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus must take part in discussing a comprehensive agreement on banning tests of any mass destruction weapons on a par with Russia and other nuclear countries."

Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan was ready to put forth an initiative for compiling a single global register of all people afflicted by radiation from nuclear blasts and atomic incidents. He said the World Health Organisation and international ecological organisations could undertake the job.

Speaking about the effect of nuclear testing on the Chinese testing site Lop-Nor not far from the border with Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev noted that there was a vast field for cooperation in cleaning-up the after-effects of nuclear blasts in the interests of the two peoples with the participation of Chinese and Kazakh scientists and business communities.

Participants in the congress spoke in favour of establishing an international fund under the UN aegis to help people in territories affected by effects of nuclear tests. All nuclear countries must become the fund's members, they said.

TAJIKISTAN

Islamic Power Could Mean Nuclear Proliferation

PM3008150593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Leonid Veksler, associate of the Russian Scientific Center (Kurchatov Institute), and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Aleksandr Pelts under the "Army and Society" general heading: "Uranium for the Mojahedin, or the Nuclear Aspect of the Civil War in Tajikistan—A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Investigation"]

[Excerpts] First, a bit of history.

Radioactive ores were discovered in Tajikistan back in the 1930's during a routine integrated Pamir-Tajik expedition. At the time they made no secret of it: Taboshar's uranium quarry was even mentioned in the tourist brochure. In April 1943, however, everything relating to work which had begun on the "atomic project" was given the seal of secrecy.

It was here in Taboshar that the first Soviet uranium plant was built shortly after this (1946). After a number

of processing operations, its product was loaded into industrial reactors for accumulating weapons-grade plutonium. The first of these—the legendary “Annushka”—reached its designated capacity 22 July 1948 at Chelyabinsk-40 (now the “Mayak” Production Association). Shortly afterward, enriched ore from Tajikistan served as the raw material for the first plutonium bomb, which was exploded 29 August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk Test Range. [passage omitted]

Natural Wealth

The former USSR's entire complex of nuclear fuel-related enterprises is located in northern Tajikistan. Uranium extraction is undertaken in mines in Adrasman and the aforementioned Taboshar, where according to available information a missile production complex is also located, at the fluorite-uranium mine in Naugyarzan Chigrik, and also in Kyzyl-Dzhikhar, where along with uranium ore it is also possible to extract gold. Furthermore, the editorial office has information on the presence of uranium reserves in Charkesar, which is also attracting the attention of foreign “interested parties.”

Naturally, it would be nice to know for sure just which countries are concerned here. A precise answer is given by leading experts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, who meet regularly twice a year to analyze and forecast the situation regarding nuclear weapons. At the last conference held recently on the initiative of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (California) in the German city of Bad Ems, specialists from the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other countries came to the conclusion that the world is on the threshold of a fresh round of nuclear weapons proliferation. Moreover, the experts noted with alarm that in recent years there has been a clear trend toward the acquisition primarily of slightly enriched materials used for industrial purposes rather than finished components for nuclear weapons. The reason is obvious—that way it is easier to “cover any tracks” and to deflect the emerging suspicions of the world community.

During the conference it was noted that the collapse of the USSR and the many regional conflicts have created a unique opportunity to “disseminate” uranium-rich raw materials. And although many former Union republics (Belarus, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) signed an agreement on export controls, experts demonstrated convincingly that this document is not working. Only in Russia have export controls been established so far.

This is the view of the professionals. Now for some information which for obvious reasons is extremely difficult to verify. Back on 6 January 1992, an independent Austrian source reported on talks between Tajikistan and Pakistan. Matters centered on the possibility of selling nuclear materials to Pakistan. Little is known as yet about the results of these talks, but we think that precise data will appear soon.

In the period from January through March 1992 there were numerous reports on talks in Tajikistan regarding the export of uranium and weapons technologies which were conducted with representatives of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Lebanon. The results of these, too, have remained secret up to now.

Production Capacity

Mining administrations were set up in the mid 1940's, and their output was conveyed to uranium plant “V” in the vicinity of Leninabad (now Khudzhand) which was subsequently given the name of Combine No. 6 and “expanded” into the city of Chkalovsk. Together with the Taboshar and Adrasman plants, it formed the former USSR's first complex for producing uranium.

In 1992 Chkalovsk brought almost 2,000 metric tons of mixed oxide of uranium “to the surface,” which amounts to the bulk of uranium production in the CIS. After appropriate enrichment to the isotope U-235, the uranium can be used either in nuclear warheads or in nuclear reactors of various designations.

Yuriy Nesgorov, director of the Chkalovsk Combine, believes the sale of natural uranium to foreign firms to be wholly feasible. But he stresses that it would lead not only to a fall in uranium prices but would also create the preconditions for the uncontrolled entry of nuclear raw materials into so-called “third world” countries.

We all know that there is no smoke without fire. The very same experts noted, for instance, that nobody today can guarantee that Iran does not have secret centers for nuclear research, which would, of course, need raw material. Moreover, they are unanimous in the belief that within eight years Iran will be able to make its own bomb. Even now with the help of China and a number of Western countries it is building a complex of five nuclear research centers. The evaluations expressed in respect of Iraq and Pakistan are more reserved. But at the same time experts do not doubt their interest in nuclear materials in general, and in weapons technologies in particular.

There is, however, one substantial reservation which should be made here. The international conference has information mainly concerning the official institutions of those countries under International Atomic Energy Agency control. The picture omits the extremist forces of countries which as yet do not advertise their activity. But you know, it is no longer a secret that these too are taking part in the hunt for Tajikistan uranium, and they pay generously for the “services” of gunmen. The stakes are clear: It is easier to do business with the Islamic fundamentalists should they accede to power.

Once again, the situation in Tajikistan is alarming. A few days ago, the armed opposition openly stated its readiness to carry out an extensive operation aimed at overthrowing the incumbent government. If they succeed in achieving the stated aim, then the uranium industry inherited by Tajikistan after the collapse of the USSR

will to all intents and purposes shake off the fetters of control. And that includes the control of the world community. So who will get their hands on it?

UKRAINE

Talks Held With U.S. Officials on Nuclear Arms Aid

LD0109095993 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian
0700 GMT 1 Sep 93

[Text] Kiev, 31 Aug—Negotiations opened here on 30 August until 1 September on the U.S. technical and financial assistance to Ukraine aimed at the implementation of specific programs for the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. At issue is a grant of \$175 billion [as heard], in line with the Nunn-Lugar amendment. This amendment regulates the U.S. defense department's spending for the 1993 fiscal year. A framework agreement is being negotiated to define the legal basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons by Ukraine.

The U.S. delegation is being led by Ambassador at large James Goodby, and the Ukrainian delegation by Lieutenant General Oleksiy Kryzhko.

Nuclear Workers Against Closure of Chernobyl AES

LD0109094793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 1 Sep 93

The Central Trade Union Committee of Atomic Energy and Industry Workers and the Ukrainian State Committee for the Exploitation of Atomic Energy support a proposal from labor collectives of the sector's enterprises to convene the first congress of power engineering in Ukraine on 20-22 September this year. A letter which proposes to discuss and formulate so-called priority demands to the president, the Supreme Council, and Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers, has already been sent to the localities.

The trade union leadership proposes formulating one of the main points of the demands as follows: To take urgent measures against the slide toward a fuel and energy crisis, including cancelling the moratorium on commissioning generating sets of nuclear power stations that have a high degree of preparedness, and to review the decision on closing down the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station in 1993.

Former Vice Premier Urges Nonnuclear Status

LD3108134493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1308 GMT 31 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Kiev August 31 TASS—Ukraine must have a non-nuclear status, ex-Ukrainian Vice-Premier Academician Igor Yukhnovsky told republican parliament

Tuesday, when dwelling on an alternative program to overcome the current crisis in Ukraine.

The non-nuclear status will enable guaranteed safety of Ukraine, said Yukhnovsky, speaking on the eve of a Russian-Ukrainian summit in the Crimea. The status is also expected to bring feasible economic benefits, as nuclear warheads could be sold to Russia or the United States in exchange to [as received] money or enriched uranium.

The ex-vice-premier is sure Ukraine should not keep intercontinental missiles on its territory, as it is not able on its own to maintain the missiles or control their launch, which is fraught with a military danger to Ukraine.

Thus, a policy of nuclear disarmament is necessary for the country, said Yukhnovsky, whose opinion is valued in the parliament.

He believes Ukraine must decide how much arms it needs for the national armed forces and sell the excessive weaponry. A reliable source of hard currency incomes for the republican budget could be sales of Ukrainian-made arms, including tanks, precise terminal guidance missiles and explosives.

He also supports the idea of shipping fuel to Ukraine from Turkmenistan via Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Foreign Ministry Official Urges European Security System

AU2908204793 Poznan WPROST in Polish
22 Aug 93 p 4

[Statement by Boris Tarasiuk, deputy foreign minister responsible for security affairs; place and date not given: "Nuclear Card"]

[Text] "Europe today is made up of large units—NATO, the WEU [Western European Union], the EC, and the Visegrad Group, just to name a few. We want to create a whole out of these elements and that is the aim of our initiative concerning the establishment of a general European security system."

"The emergence of a new Europe cannot be solely confined to the West because Europe would then be divided. We are interested in integrating all states and blocks—from the Atlantic to the Urals. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, peace can only be guaranteed by a European security system, and it is not only Ukraine that is concerned about the absence of such a system. We are very carefully following the efforts made by some states that belonged to the old Eastern Bloc to find a place in Western European security structures. However, we can see that this is not yielding results."

"As far back as 1990, we declared that Ukraine will become a state without nuclear weapons. Those are not empty assurances because we are actively realizing the program. It suffices to present the facts: In May 1992,

tactical nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine and we also proposed a revision of the START-I Treaty so that it would become a multilateral agreement. We would also like our parliament to adopt a stance on such an important issue."

"Foreign observers of our political scene accuse many Ukrainian politicians of opposing the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from our territory and believe that our declarations are only tactical moves. That is not true, but Ukrainian politicians are concerned about the future of the state and are demanding that the government find answers to the questions troubling them: Who will guarantee the security of Ukraine when we freely give up the third largest quantity of nuclear weapons in the world? Where will Ukraine find the resources necessary for nuclear disarmament? The sums are colossal and we simply cannot afford to spend such sums today."

"Whose hands will the weapons end up in and who will gain financially from the radioactive materials they contain is also a matter of concern to us. There are also other questions that our parliament expects answers to. Unfortunately, it has not received them because not everything depends on us. We are fulfilling our duties as members of the international community and we expect the same from the UN Security Council—that it should guarantee our security."

"Contrary to various suggestions, Ukraine is not playing a 'nuclear card,' but we would be bad politicians if we were not guided by the interests of our society and state. That is why in agreeing to nuclear disarmament, we must receive clear guarantees that no nuclear state will use its weapons against us or will apply economic pressure on us. Unfortunately, it is only wishful thinking for the time being."

"Poland is one of the few European states that—long before independence was officially declared—foresaw how the situation would develop in Ukraine and established diplomatic relations with us. Unfortunately, now there are grounds for criticizing both sides. After all, we believe that both states' problems are similar to a large extent. Poland and Ukraine can act as a 'cementing factor' in Central-Eastern Europe. The countries possess a significant industrial, agricultural, scientific, technical, and, of course, military potential. So, both states should perform a stabilizing role not only for our region but also for the entire continent."

Defense Ministry Studies Feasibility of Space-Missile Force

*LD0309215293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1955 GMT 3 Sep 93*

[Text] Kiev, [no date as received]—According to a directive by Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov, a number of Defense Ministry and general headquarters directorates have launched an inquiry into the feasibility of setting up Ukrainian missile and space forces. The need for such an inquiry arose after

Ukraine's armed forces inherited from the Soviet Army part of the USSR antimissile defense system, several land-based space surveillance stations, and two ships with a similar task, attached to the port of Odessa. Experts believe that these objects can be used in satellite communications, sea navigation, and meteorology. Cooperation with NATO or Russian systems would be necessary to use the technology for military purposes.

The results of the inquiry will be submitted to Ukraine's defense minister by 15 September.

Further on Agreements With Russia on Nuclear Weapons

*LD0409064993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0638 GMT 4 Sep 93*

[Text] Moscow September 4 TASS—Russia and Ukraine have signed three agreements on the utilisation of nuclear weapons and control over strategic missiles stationed in both republics.

The agreements were signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kuchma who accompanied the presidents of the two countries to the summit meeting held in the Crimea on Saturday [as received].

The signed documents include an agreement on utilisation of nuclear warheads, basic principles of utilisation of nuclear warheads from strategic missiles stationed in Ukraine and an agreement on control over exploitation of strategic missile complexes deployed in Russia and Ukraine.

Government To Disarm, Transfer Nuclear Weapons to Russia

*AU0309140593 Paris AFP in English
1352 GMT 3 Sep 93*

[Text] Yalta, Ukraine, Sept 3 (AFP)—Ukraine agreed Friday to dismantle its nuclear weapons and transfer them to Russia, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told a press conference here.

All Ukrainian missiles will be dismantled and removed to Russia, making it the sole nuclear power in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Yeltsin said after talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kravchuk.

The missiles will be dismantled by Russia.

Ukraine has come under strong pressure from Russia and the West to give up its nuclear weapons and ratify arms treaties signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Russia will compensate Ukraine for the missiles by providing unenriched uranium for civilian nuclear use.

Incident at Weapons Store, Russian Nuclear Experts Called

*PM1309153093 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Sep 93 p 1*

["Own information" report: "Let's Hope They Don't Land Themselves in Trouble..."]

[Text] It has become known to the editorial office that on Sunday 12 September a group of experts from the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry flew to a nuclear-technical unit stationed on Ukrainian territory. The group includes chief designers and developers [razrabotchiki] of nuclear munitions. The Russian nuclear experts were invited by Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.

The reason: In the unit's storage facilities there had been a change in temperature conditions for the storage of nuclear munitions which are currently being removed

from combat status by Ukrainian specialists. It has not been confirmed that it was the nuclear munitions that caused the original change in the temperature parameters. But the experts from Russia have already noted a gross violation of norms for the storage of nuclear munitions in this technical unit's storage facilities. The munitions considerably exceed the established norms, and this led to a sharp increase in background radiation, which became unsafe for the health of service personnel.

It is well known that the Russian Federation Defense Ministry has repeatedly and persistently proposed that nuclear munitions be relocated from Ukrainian territory to Russia. And that the nuclear safety situation thereby be normalized. However, these proposals have gone unanswered. Political ambition prevailed.

Sunday's incident is seen as the first and highly serious warning sign. Let us hope it does not become an alarm signal.

GERMANY

Machine Components for Iran Seized at Italian Border

AU2808205793 Hamburg BILD in German
28 Aug 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "German Weapons for Iran"?]

[Text] Rome—Are German companies trying to smuggle weapons for Iran across the Brenner border crossing? Italian customs authorities have stopped four trucks from Cologne with 20 sealed crates. Their destination was Iran. Officially, they contain components for machine tools. Initial examinations have revealed that some machine parts can also be used for the construction of guns.

TURKEY

Officer Views Antimissile Defense Capability, 'Threat'

NC3108095393 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS
in English 27 Aug 93 pp 1, 11

[Report by Murat Yetkin]

[Text] Ankara—Turkey has limited air defense capability to intercept a tactical ballistic missile launched against it, said a high-ranking Turkish official.

Brigadier General Hursit Tolon, secretary general of the Turkish General Staff, responded in writing to TDN's [TURKISH DAILY NEWS] questions saying that Turkey has some "active and passive" measures to decrease the damage of the missiles.

Tolon said that to decrease the effects by the missiles on Turkey, work has been done to increase the camouflage, hiding, mobility, and damage-repair capabilities of possible missile targets. He also said there are measures under way to enhance Turkey's early-warning systems.

"The basic principle is the destruction of the ballistic missiles at their sites, before they are launched," said Tolon. "There is work under way to maintain this capability and to enhance intelligence efforts to spot sites of ballistic missiles and their command-control facilities (of surrounding countries possessing missiles) posing threats."

The research report, "Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Turkey," published earlier this year by Sitki Egeli, an expert at Turkey's Defense Industry Undersecretariat (SSM), showed that most of Turkey's big cities and military bases, including the capital, Ankara, are within the range of missiles owned by Syria, Iraq and, Iran.

Egeli emphasized that if Syria owns the North Korean-made No Dong-1 missiles, with a range of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles), even Istanbul will be under a missile threat. (TDN July 30, 1993)

Pointing out that Turkey is included in NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] joint air-defense umbrella, Tolon said examples of the protection the umbrella provides were clearly evident during the Gulf War, when allied air-defense units were deployed to Turkey to intercept missiles from the "threatening country."

United States and Dutch Patriot antimissile batteries were deployed to Turkey as a precaution against Iraqi Scud missile attacks.

Tolon said, without elaborating on them, that there are ongoing studies on "certain projects" to transfer the necessary technology from the United States and other NATO-member countries for a more efficient antimissile defense capability for Turkey.

Turkey is under missile threat from almost all neighboring countries, except Greece, according to General Staff records.

Syria

Syria is giving particular attention to its long-range missile purchase and manufacturing program. The Turkish General Staff says it has information indicating that Syria will start manufacturing its own missiles within two to three years, with the assistance of China and North Korea.

Syria has the following missile systems: Former Soviet-made Frog-7, 65 KM (40 miles) range; former Soviet-made Scud-B, 280-320 KM (174-198 miles) range; North Korean-made Scud-C, 575-600 KM (357-372 miles) range; former Soviet-made SS-21, 70-120 KM (43-74 miles) range; and Chinese-made M-9 (DF015), 600 KM (372 miles) range.

Iran

The Turkish military thinks Iran aims to be a major military power in the Middle East and is concentrating on its long-range missile programs. Again with the assistance of China and North Korea, Iran is expected to manufacture its own systems within one to two years.

Iran has the following known missile systems: Former Soviet-made Frog-7, 65 KM (40 miles) range, North Korean-made Scud-B, 280-320 KM (174-198 miles) range; North Korean-made Scud-C (Scud-PIP), 575-600 KM (357-372 miles) range, M-9 (CSS-X-6), 600 KM (372 miles) range; and Iran's own Mushak 120 (Jazeat) missiles, 120 KM (74 miles) range. Iran has another missile program under way, called TUNDAR- 68.

Iraq

Before the Gulf War, Iraq had former Soviet-made Frog-7, 65 KM (40 miles) range; former Soviet made Scud-B, 280-320 KM (174-198 miles) range; Iraq's modification of Scud-Bs, Al-Hussein, 600 KM (372 miles) range and Al Abbas, 900 KM (558 miles) range missiles. According to the cease-fire accord signed between Iraq and the United Nations, Iraq cannot possess missiles

having more than a 150 KM (93 miles) range, but experts believe Iraq might have hidden 80 to 200 Scud-B's from U.N. inspectors.

The Turkish military says no missile threat is expected from Iraq in near future.

The Turkish General Staff says Bulgaria has Frog-7, Scud-B, and SS-23 missiles in its inventory, and there are some known short-range missile launchers in Armenia and Georgia. General Tolon noted that those countries have the capability to mount chemical warheads on those missiles.

Objections to \$2-Billion Iranian Rearming Campaign

*NC0709093393 Istanbul SABAH in Turkish
3 Sep 93 p 11*

[Report by Sedat Sertoglu: "Iran's Dreadful Missiles"]

[Text] Iran's rearming campaign has become a serious problem for Turkey. According to the information Ankara has received from Western sources, Iran has recently concluded an agreement with the DPRK to manufacture the multipurpose Nodong missiles. The agreement will also enable Iran to increase the missiles' range.

The Nodong missiles Iran will acquire have a range of 1,300 km. Iran will be able to hit many parts of Turkey, including Ankara, easily. As well as their conventional warheads, the missiles can be modified to carry nuclear warheads.

Regional countries are carefully following Iran's excessive rearming effort at a time when it is confronted with very serious economic problems. Pakistan, which supports Iran on international platforms, recently expressed concern over its rearming campaign, which is aimed at giving offensive capability to Iran.

In addition to manufacturing the Nodong missiles, Iran has moved to purchase its third submarine from Russia. And Tehran is holding talks with Moscow to purchase 200 modern T-72 tanks and 75 MiG-29 military aircraft. Iran's rearming program also includes the production of nuclear arms.

Bargaining Talks With PRC

Iran is holding talks with the PRC to acquire the technology it needs to manufacture nuclear arms. But, Beijing is reportedly worried that the talks it has been having with Iran to establish nuclear power plants in Iran could prompt the United States and other Western countries to pressure the PRC.

The Hashemi-Rafsanjani administration has reportedly launched a serious initiative with Japan to acquire a loan for the arms it plans to buy. Japan has been informed that the loan will be used for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, Iran will use the funds to buy arms. Tehran cannot say it wants to acquire missiles with a range of 1,300 km for defensive purposes.

Iran allocated \$2 billion to its rearming campaign in 1992. Experts have ascertained that it could only use \$850 million for that purpose. Whether or not Iran can spend \$2 billion on arms in 1993 remains to be seen.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

9 DEC 93